


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CAB 163

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1ST REVIEW
28/5/81

~~NEXT REVIEW, 25 YRS.~~
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J 310/1 Pt2

Date of Registration

3 JAN 1980

CAB163/141

Previous Reference **J 310/1 Pt. I**

For Cross References see inside of Cover

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498

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

WEST

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Sino Soviet Relations

[Signature]

10-9-69

J 310/1 Pt2

File No.

Subject

X-REF. *Sino-Soviet Bloc Study Groups 332/8.*

Date

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J 310/1 Pt 2

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Joint Intelligence Committee
West

Soviet Foreign Policy
Sino-Soviet relations.

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FIRST REVIEW FORM

1. FILE NUMBER: J310/1 pt 2
2. FILE TITLE: West German foreign Policy. Sino Soviet relations
3. DATE OF FIRST REVIEW: MAY 1981
4. DESK OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION GIVEN ON CABFORM 66:
(Tick box)

Destroy at First Review	Retain for further review at years (Insert number)	Second Review	No CABFORM 66 recommendation given
			✓

5. REVIEWING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION:
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6. REVIEWING OFFICER'S COMMENTS ON HIS/HER RECOMMENDATION ABOVE:
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Signature of reviewing officer R Lawrence

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With the compliments of
PLANNING STAFF
(P. Cradock)

J. A. Thomson, Esq.,
Cabinet Office.

FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, S.W.1.

196

20 March 1970

Registry

Mr. Richardson 4-3/4
Dr. Giffard 9+
FOLIO 113
B 29/3

Sir T. Brimelow

American Paper on the Implications for NATO
of the Sino/Soviet Dispute

--- I attach a copy of the American paper prepared for the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group's discussion of this subject, held in Brussels last week.

2. The first thirty pages contain an analysis of the Sino/Soviet dispute which does not differ substantially from our own, though it is interesting that the Americans apparently expect that on Mao's death the Chinese may undertake a fundamental review of their policy options (paragraph 27). This carries the probably over-optimistic implication that even if there has been no change over Taiwan the Union attitude towards the U.S. might alter substantially. Section V (the implications for NATO), and particularly pages 37-49 on the possibility of major hostilities and their consequences, makes interesting reading, which I recommend to you if you have time.



(P. Cradock)
Planning Staff
20 March, 1970

c.c. (with enclosure)

Mr. Wilford
Mr. Murray
Mr. Giffard
Mr. Allinson
Mr. Waterfield
Mr. Orchard
Mr. Thomson (Cabinet Office)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group/Class Cab 163
Piece 141

US PAPER "THE SINO-SOVIET
DISPUTE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO".

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(date) 10.2.05
(Signed) *Chy*

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Registry



is
Mr Mackenbach
Mr Haffey

With the compliments of

PLANNING STAFF
(P. Cradock)

JG

J. A. Thomson, Esq.,
Cabinet Office.

FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON, S.W.1.

20 March 1970

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SECRET AND GUARD

112

10 APR 1970

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Permanent Under-Secretary

MEETING OF THE ATLANTIC POLICY ADVISORY GROUP
(APAG) IN BRUSSELS MARCH 1970

The Atlantic Policy Advisory Group - the twice yearly meeting of Planners from NATO countries - met at NATO Headquarters in Brussels from 9-13 March. The subject was: "The implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute for NATO".

--- 2. The meeting reached agreed conclusions, of which I attach a copy. A separate Chairman's report is under preparation and will provide a summary of the discussion. Both will be submitted to the North Atlantic Council. The conclusions are very close to our own rewrite of a Secretariat draft, which the Secretariat subsequently circulated as their own, for discussion. It was amended but not substantially altered in the course of consideration by the meeting.

3. As you will see, the conclusions predict continued Sino-Soviet antagonism short of war as the most likely course of events. On balance, this was thought to be of advantage to NATO countries, though they are advised to maintain a policy of impartiality. The contingency of major Sino-Soviet hostilities was judged more remote. If kept within certain limits such hostilities might bring NATO some benefit; but there could, of course, be no assurance that hostilities would be so limited, and in general the dangers in this situation would be considerable. The third contingency, a reconciliation, was also judged unlikely and would also bring substantial disadvantages to the West.

4. The discussion produced few surprises. There was general agreement, and the debate was dominated by the United States, the French, Germans, Canadians and ourselves. The following is a summary of some of the more interesting points.

5. Although it was agreed that the Russians were unlikely to initiate major hostilities against the Chinese (and the Chinese even less likely to do so against the Soviet Union), there was nevertheless some examination of the form such hostilities might take. Preference was expressed for a punitive land expedition by the Russians designed to inflict a sharp military and prestige defeat on the Chinese, or a pre-emptive air strike, probably conventional, against Chinese nuclear and missile installations. It was thought

SECRET AND GUARD

that, while the Russians might try to stir up dissension in the Chinese leadership, they were unlikely to foment trouble among minorities, e.g. in Sinkiang, because of their own vulnerability on this score. It was argued that the Chinese achievement of "an effective nuclear deterrent capability" was critical in predictions, since it provided a terminus ad quem beyond which the Russians would not even consider the possibility of an attack on China. But no-one was able to define just what such an effective deterrent capability would be or when the Chinese might reach this point; the Americans seemed unwilling to admit that there would ever be a time when a Soviet attack on China was quite out of the question; in the end the meeting compromised with the vague statement that a Soviet attack would be less likely once the Chinese had an effective deterrent capability.

6. The dangers in major hostilities were seen as including the possible involvement of third countries, the breaking of the embargo on the use of nuclear weapons, the spread of radioactive fallout, the likely emergence of the Soviet Union as a victorious military power, and the danger, if war were protracted, of nationalist uprisings in Eastern Europe. These potential dangers would outweigh any possible gains and would demand a cautious hands-off policy from the West. Asked what they saw as the chief dangers in the event of such a war, the Americans said first the erosion of the barrier against the use of nuclear weapons. But they added, and they probably saw this as the principal risk, that Soviet military power would allow the Soviet Union to shatter China and to emerge as the undisputed leader of the Communist world.

7. It was agreed that Western leverage on either party would be fairly limited if war seemed imminent. There would certainly be heavy diplomatic activity, action at the U.N., public statements, etc., designed to increase moral pressure on both protagonists. NATO would have to take precautions, but should clearly signal to the Soviet Union that these measures were purely defensive.

8. In the more likely event of continued Sino/Soviet antagonism short of war, it was agreed that impartiality would be the best policy for the West. But, given the multitude of Western contacts with the Soviet Union and the paucity of such contacts with China, there was some difficulty in defining what impartiality should mean. To the Chinese, U.S. 'impartiality' would not seem very convincing. A number of delegations, particularly the French, urged that Western countries should take the initiative in increasing contacts with China. The Americans were unwilling to see such an exhortation in the agreed

conclusions and wanted it balanced by a call to NATO countries to cooperate in strengthening non-Communist countries on the periphery of China. In the end the meeting compromised on the anodyne statement that contacts with China are at present minimal and that China's continuing isolation is not in the long-term interests of international stability.

9. The Americans were unforthcoming in the open discussion on their Warsaw contacts with the Chinese and their expectations for future Sino/U.S. relations. They gave us their private view (a) that there were signs of Chinese interest in the Sino/U.S. talks but it was not clear whether this was merely as a means of bringing pressure on the Soviet Union or a wish to make substantial improvement in relations with the United States; (b) the United States were still not clear how far Taiwan constituted a complete barrier to any progress.

10. The meeting was cautious and realistic in assessing the impact of the Soviet preoccupation with China on Soviet policy in Europe. They were inclined to see its effect as a difference of tone rather than of substance in Soviet policy and added a caution in the conclusions on the need to avoid unfounded expectations that the West could relax its defence effort simply because of the Sino/Soviet dispute.

Participants

--- 11. I attach a list of participants. The U.S. delegation was led by Cargo, Head of the State Department's Planning and Coordination staff and one of the main authors of the President's recent foreign policy report. He was solid rather than inspired and in the discussion was usually guided by the rest of his team. I had a general talk with him on Europe and East-West relations but found him not particularly well briefed. He seems to spend more of his time coordinating than in planning. The second American participant, Neubert, played a more active part, and was inclined to take a bolder view than most of the possible advantages to the West of both continued Sino/Soviet antagonism and a Sino/Soviet war. Oncken, who led the German delegation, has only just taken over as Head of the Planning Staff in the German Foreign Ministry (as Egon Bahr's successor). He was formerly Minister in Washington. He has as yet no staff and was not briefed for the meeting. However, he holds forthright opinions, which he puts forward in a deceptively restrained way, and will I imagine play a considerable part in future APAG meetings. Oncken suggested that he should come over to London in a month or so's time to discuss our experiences of planning and I have agreed to this. The French

participant, Pierre Cerles, has just returned from Peking, where he was Minister/Counsellor, and was an excellent source of up-to-date information on Chinese attitudes and policies. He played a generally helpful and constructive part in the meeting, though this probably reflected his personal interests and character rather than the French attitude to NATO discussion. The Canadians were well represented by Ford, their Ambassador in Moscow. He provided a first-class analysis of Soviet thinking on the Sino/Soviet dispute, which underlined the strains on the Soviet economy which its continuation could cause. The other delegations played only very minor parts. The Scandinavians proved unnecessarily obstructive during drafting of the conclusions. They were reluctant to see the conclusions express a clear judgement that certain aspects of the dispute might be to the advantage of the West and particularly to see anything said of possible advantages in Sino/Soviet hostilities, on the grounds that this might be interpreted to mean that the West should take action to stimulate them.

Papers Submitted

12. Besides our own contribution (which was based on the paper on the Sino/Soviet dispute prepared for the Planning Committee), papers were submitted before the meeting by the Americans, Germans, Dutch, Belgians and Italians. Only the American paper adds significantly to our own assessment of the dispute and its implications and I shall be circulating it separately. It was also the only contribution which was presented as a formal paper without the usual APAG proviso that it was a personal essay. The paper contains a useful section dealing with the possible forms which hostilities between China and the Soviet Union might take and their possible consequences both for the principals and for other countries.

Form of the meeting

13. This was the first meeting of APAG in the new form proposed by the Americans last year with the aim of providing NATO with machinery for the analysis of problems of long-term importance to the Alliance. It differed from past meetings of APAG in that it was held at NATO Headquarters; members of Permanent Delegations were invited to participate, though in fact they played only a very minor part in the proceedings; and the group produced agreed conclusions for submission to the North Atlantic Council. The difficulty was that the best part of two days was consumed in detailed drafting of the agreed conclusions, and this might have been a much longer process had we had a more contentious subject and one in which NATO countries were more directly involved. This inevitably raises the question whether this is the best

use of Planners' time. Doubts were expressed by the Canadians and some other delegations on this score, and the Chairman, Herr Kastl, was not entirely happy with the new system. The free-ranging APAG is probably the ideal form. The problem here is that it requires not only very good participants who are prepared to speculate, but also a first-class Chairman who is capable of reducing a wide-ranging discussion to a readable and brief report. The Americans are attached to the new form of APAG and sensitive to criticism of it. The smaller countries may also see value in agreed conclusions, since it gives them something to draw on for domestic use. On balance, I think we should acquiesce in continuing with the present system, that is a "structured APAG" in Brussels once a year, and a free-ranging, i.e. old-style, APAG in other capitals once a year.

Next Meeting of APAG

14. For its next meeting, APAG will revert to its free-ranging form (now christened "APAG promeneuse"). The meeting will take place at Ditchley Park in September. There was some discussion of subjects for the meeting, and it was finally agreed to recommend three for the Council to choose from. These were (a) The Outlook for the Middle East in the Long Term and its Implications for NATO; (b) Future Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy; and (c) the Evolution of Soviet policy towards Europe.

Krasnik

(P. Cradock)
Planning Staff
20 March, 1970

c.c. Sir T. Brimelow
Mr. Wilford
Mr. Bendall
Mr. Giffard
Mr. Waterfield
Mr. Murray
Mr. Pemberton-Piggot (UKDEL NATO)
Mr. Millard (WASHINGTON)
✓ Mr. Thomson (CABINET OFFICE)

NATO Document


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Reference: APAG (70) 3

Date: 13.3.70

Signed



Date 10.2.05

Cabinet Office
Admiralty Arch
The Mall
London

NATO Document


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Reference: APAG (70) 4 (Final)

Date: 16.3.70

Signed



Date 10.2.05


Cabinet Office
Admiralty Arch
The Mall
London



BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

FOLIO
109

SECRET
(C.3/1)



6 March 1970

Dear Brian,

Sino-Soviet Relations

33 Bich
Mr. [Signature]
I should let you know that, regrettably, *who* as you will remember from my letter C.3/1 of 20 January, was intending to produce a paper on what might happen if the Peking talks broke down, died from a heart attack on 24 February. After a suitable interval, I asked his Chief, who would be taking place and whether he would go ahead and produce the proposed paper. *has now told me that* they are finding some difficulty in selecting a successor for and I must take it that the proposed paper, which was very much *own idea*, would be put on the shelf for some time. Before his death, I did put to the thoughts contained in John Thomson's letter, J.310/1 of 5 February. I was not, however, able to go over with him the notes sent by Jock Joslin in his D/DISSEC/20/1/9 of 13 February. *108*

2. I will keep in touch with *about this question* and let you know if his section in OCI decide to take it up again.

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
Yours ever,
John

(E. BOLLAND)

B.T.W. Stewart, Esq., CMG.,
Cabinet Office.

Sent via cc J.A. Thomson, Esq., Cabinet Office
C.N. Joslin, Esq., DIS/MOD
J.K.E. Broadley, Esq., PUSD/FCO.

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
J.310/1

Dear Eddie,

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1. Mr. *Hyatt*
2. Registry

108
FOLIO



CABINET OFFICE

LONDON S.W.1

5th February, 1970

SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

We were interested in your account (in your letter to Brian Stewart (C.3/1) of 20th January)) of your talk with and also to know that OCI are thinking of doing a paper on what might happen if the Sino/Soviet border talks were to break down. If the Americans are able to let us have a sight of the proposed study, if and when it is completed, we should naturally welcome it.

2. We have no plans ourselves for any formal study of the possible consequences of a breakdown in the Peking talks; but the following off-the-cuff thoughts may be of some help to you when you next talk to I must emphasise that they represent the personal views of members of the Assessments Staff, and have not been cleared with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office or any other Whitehall Department.

3. We agree that the Russians (paragraph 2 of your letter) would probably like the current talks to develop into negotiations and an ultimate agreement (though probably only an agreement on frontier demarcation, since they would surely have more to lose than to gain by negotiating an agreement with the Chinese on "wider issues" except on Soviet terms). The Chinese by contrast appear to have no interest in this possibility, and this accounts for a large measure of the difference between the negotiating positions of the two sides. We do not, however, think it likely that any breakdown would be caused by the Chinese rather than the Russians (as paragraph 3 of your letter implies). It seems to us improbable that the Chinese would deliberately break off the talks, since -

- (a) to do so would undermine their claim to be the reasonable party in the dispute;
- (b) they clearly feel some genuine concern at least about the possibility of a Soviet attack - this concern, as says, helped bring them to the conference table in the first place - and they probably estimate that to leave the table would increase the chances of such an attack.

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It is in the interest of neither side to break off the talks. If either does, however, we think it will be the Russians: first, because they are temperamentally the more likely to crack, and secondly, because the fact that they are playing away from home puts them in a weaker position. While there is a stalemate, the Chinese negotiators can put in token appearances at the table and get on with other business at other times; while their Soviet counterparts have to sit it out in the uncongenial surroundings of Peking, unable to occupy their spare time with any more profitable affairs.

4. Having said this, we agree with that in the event of a breakdown the Russians would revert to "threat" propaganda, stimulating public discussion about the possibility of Soviet military action. The object of this, however, would be to try to scare the Chinese, not so much into returning to the conference table (which if the assumptions in my previous paragraph are correct they would not take much persuading to do) as to giving way on the rigid preconditions to substantive talks which they are reported to have laid down. We think it less likely than it was six months ago that the Russians would actually carry out their threat. Developments of the past six months - in SALT, Soviet/German Relations, etc. - will have done nothing to reduce their wish to avoid an explosion on the Chinese front. They probably intend to sit it out there in the hope, however slight, that Mao's eventual death will result in a softening in the Chinese attitude.

5. Our best guess therefore is that if the talks break down, the two sides will dance out much the same quadrille as during the period March-September 1969. There will be plenty of vicious propaganda and invective from both sides, the Russians will threaten military action, the Chinese will intensify their "war preparations", and there may be more border incidents. It is possible that the eventual outcome will be another round of talks, although it will be even more difficult to engineer this than last time.

6. In the event of a breakdown it would be logical for the Chinese, as one of the only tactics available to them for breaking out of the vicious circle of stalemated talks, propaganda and threats, to try to worry the Russians by showing increasing interest in talking to the Americans.

*Yours ever
John*

(J.A. THOMSON)

E. Bolland, Esq.,
JIC Liaison Officer,
WASHINGTON.

Copies to: Mr. Stewart, JIC
Mr. Joslin, MOD
Mr. Broadley, FCO

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
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

107
01/6

SECRET

(C.3/1)

J 310/1



20 January 1970

Dear Mr. Stewart,

Sino-Soviet Relations

You will be interested to know that ~~who is in charge of Soviet foreign relations in OCI, CIA, told me today that he and~~ of the China Section of OCI were intending to draft a short paper on what might happen should the Sino/Soviet Border talks break down. Their study might result in no more than an internal note for ~~but~~ he hoped he would be able to let me see it.

ASREF B

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~~SECRET~~

~~MINDEF~~

2. said he thought that, largely for political reasons, the Russians would want the current talks to develop into negotiations and eventually to result in an agreement. They did not like waging public polemics with the Chinese as this weakened their position in foreign relations generally and also harmed the international Communist movement. Assuming, as he felt we must, that there were differences within the top Soviet leadership on how to handle the Chinese, any exacerbation of the dispute must also sharpen these differences.

3. said they thought the main reason why the Chinese had been persuaded by Kosygin to embark on the present talks was the pressure the Russians had exerted on them by their psychological campaign of last summer and autumn threatening possible military action. He expected that, if the talks failed, the Russians might again begin to spread rumours of possible military action to try to scare the Chinese into returning to the conference table. We should therefore, he thought, be ready for renewed public discussion of the possibility of Soviet military action, including possible preventive strikes, against China.

4. My only comment on this was that there had surely been other factors, as well as military pressure, which had caused the Chinese to agree to enter into the present talks. The circumstances Ho Chi Minh's funeral, in which Kosygin had presumably raised the question of talks, must have been an important factor in causing the Chinese to agree to talk. Also, the Chinese might well feel that they had little to lose by talking as it would give them an opportunity to press their territorial claims against the Russians.

B.T.W. Stewart, Esq., CMG.,
Cabinet Office.

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SECRET



SECRET

I also said that, as the Russians had not in fact made any major military attack on China in spite of all the furore last year, it seemed unlikely that were the Russians to cry wolf again this would convince the Chinese that this time they might well mean business. At the same time, I agreed it was a good idea to be thinking ahead now on the results of a possible break-down of the talks.

5. In mentioning this proposed study to me, is clearly hoping to obtain any thoughts we might have on this subject. Accordingly, if you or the other recipients of this letter have any points they could let me have to give to I am sure he would welcome them. Some contribution from us would also help to ensure that we were given a sight of any paper he and might eventually produce.


*Yours sincerely,
Hazel Miller.*

PP (E. BOLLAND)

Passed cc J.A. Thomson, Esq., Cabinet Office
C.N. Joslin, Esq., DIS/MOD
J.K.E. Broadley, Esq., PUSD/FCO.

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*Spoken with
Mr. Galloway. 9/13/11*

Mr. J. A. Thomson (Assessments Staff)

Sino/Soviet Dispute

Thank you for your minute of 5 November on the Planning paper on the Sino/Soviet Dispute.

2. I am sorry you should think that there has been an undue overlap with two Assessments Staff papers. May I make the following points in explanation:

- (a) First, the origin of the paper. It was commissioned at a meeting called by the P.U.S. in April, to which I think you were invited, and some work had been done on it, particularly by Sir T. Brimelow, by the time I took over the Planning Staff in July. The object was to provide a paper which in brief compass covered the elements of the dispute, its future course and its implications for the West and which might be read easily by Ministers. It was in essence a general paper and therefore bound to overlap here and there with more specialised assessments.
- (b) The overlap, however, is not great. The two Assessments Staff papers you quote are of very different scope. MISC 237(69)27 deals with one highly technical aspect, the impact of the Sino/Soviet dispute on the Soviet attitude to SALT. JIC(A)(69)47 is wider, dealing with the Soviet attitude to the dispute. Both are of course very valuable papers; but, in the nature of things neither has a full analysis of the Chinese attitude, or a prediction of the future course of Chinese politics, or of the development of the dispute in the long term, or of the influence of Japan, or of the dispute's implications for the West. Some three-quarters of the field is untouched. Even if we confine ourselves to the present situation, neither paper has any analysis of the doctrinal differences between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties. I doubt therefore whether the Planning paper could fairly be described as a "very similar analysis" to those you have mentioned.
- (c) Our monthly Work in Progress report, a copy of which I send you on a personal basis, has recorded the progress of this paper, and of all other Planning papers, since July.

3. In general I think that our daily contacts with members of your staff together with our exchanges of work sheets have prevented any serious duplication and should do so in the future; but I should of course be happy to talk to you about this if you wish.

/4. I am

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- 2 -

4. I am grateful for the suggestion in your paragraph 3 and have tried to cover this in an addition to the Planning paper, though I myself would not see a Sino/Soviet conflict as a favourable opportunity for an initiative to promote closer Western European unity.

Heradotus

(P. Cradock)
Planning Staff
11 November, 1969

Copied to: Sir T. Brimelow
Sir E. Peck
Mr. Wilford

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential Personal.

MINUTE SHEET:

Reference.....

Mr. Thomson

I have received from the Planning Staff (FCO) the attached copy of Mr. Gaddock's draft paper on the Sino-Soviet dispute, with an invitation to the Assessments Staff to send comments on it and an apology that they have asked us so late (the deadline is 4 November).

2. I have read the paper quickly but have not pondered over it at length since you will probably want to show it to a number of members of the Assessments Staff. My only comments are:-

para. 7 l.17 For "avoid a further escalation in" I should prefer "take some of the heat out of."

para. 8 ll.18 - end. The alternative forms of military action open to the Russians and the chances of their using them were rather better put in Mr. Mackintosh's paper on the Soviet attitude. Perhaps we might propose a redraft on the basis of the latter.

3. Privately, I must express some dismay that this, the ~~first~~ first FCO Planning paper which I have seen since joining the Assessments Staff, should to such a large extent be a duplication of our own work. Perhaps wrongly, I had assumed that the Planning Staff's function was to concern itself ^{primarily} with

/ U.K.

U.K. and allied policy (i.e. the aspects covered by paras. 17 onwards of the attached draft), basing their papers wherever possible on assessments by such organisations as ourselves — whereas the attached paper from the nature of its subject is at least two-thirds background and assessment. Admittedly it includes occasional phrases from JIC Notes which provide gratifying evidence that our work has been of some use. But the duplication of effort seems unnecessary, all the same.

P. Hunter.

30/10.

Mr. Thomson

I agree with Mr. Hunter's remarks and with your minute of 5th November, but have no further detailed comments on the paper, since mine were incorporated into those which Century House sent to the Planning Staff.

Mr.

7 Nov 69.

Noted by Mr. Thomson
12/11
EGP
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Mr. Giffard (Eastern European & Soviet Department)

Sino/Soviet Dispute

...

I attach a draft Planning paper on the elements of the Sino/Soviet dispute, its future course and its implications for the West. It has been seen by Sir T. Brimelow and Mr. Wilford and takes account of their comments. I should like to circulate it for discussion at the P.U.S.'s Planning Committee on 11 November.

2. In the meantime, I should be grateful for your comments, which should if possible be in the form of detailed amendments. The passages on frontiers in the paper (paragraphs 2(d) and 7) may in particular need some up-dating, but since the situation is fluid had better be kept in general terms.

3. Since I shall need to circulate the paper in revised form by 7 November, may I ask for your comments not later than 4 November ?

Kradock

(P. Cradock)
Planning Staff
24 October, 1969

Copied to: Mr. J. Murray (Far Eastern Dept.)
Mr. R. A. Sykes (Defence Policy Dept.)
Mr. E. E. Orchard (Research Dept.)
Mr. F. Brewer (Research Dept.)
Mr. W. L. Allinson (P.U.S.D.)

For information

Sir T. Brimelow
Mr. Burroughs
Mr. Wilford
Mr. J. F. Ford (Research Dept.)

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<p style="text-align: center;"><u>The Sino-Soviet Dispute</u></p> <p>This paper seeks to analyse briefly the elements in the Sino-Soviet dispute, to predict its future course and to assess its implications for the U.K. and the West.</p> <p>A. <u>Nature of the dispute</u></p> <p>2. The dispute, turning on some 200 years of state relations and some 48 years of party relations between China and the Soviet Union, is a vast topic and its supporting literature is correspondingly imposing. The most that can be done in a paper of this compass is to identify its main strands. A fuller treatment of the nature of the dispute is given in Annex A.</p> <p>3. The history of the dispute has been one of friction between two great states and of deepening and broadening schism between two great Communist parties. It is therefore best analysed under two main headings (a) inter-state, and (b) inter-party issues. It should, however, be realised that this is a division of convenience and that elements of both kinds are present on almost all occasions.</p> <p><u>Inter-state issues</u></p> <p>4. The main contributory factors may be listed as follows:</p> <p>(a) <u>Historical and cultural differences.</u></p> <p>The first factor here is the inevitable /friction</p>		

industrially powerful
and has no
unsatisfied
territorial ambitions;

friction between two great states having a very long common frontier (4,500 miles) and totally differing cultures and traditions. This is reinforced by the fact that they are in differing stages of development: the Soviet Union is ~~relatively rich and satisfied~~; China is still poor and struggling with the earlier stages of her economic growth. Moreover, she cherishes deep grudges against the outside world, deriving in part from Western penetration and exploitation in the 19th Century, and maintains claims against traditional Chinese territory still under foreign occupation.

(b) Chinese arrogance and Sinocentrism.

China's historical isolation and view of herself as centre of the world, have produced a state of mind in which it is virtually impossible for her to deal with other states on equal terms. These Middle Kingdom tendencies have been reinforced by the impact of Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. The addition of a particularly virulent national pride to the normal sensitivities of an emerging state make the Chinese difficult to deal with in any context. In the context of the Soviet Union, there are many additional grounds for fear and hostility, as set out below.

/(c)

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Stalin's behaviour suggested that he did not wish to see the emergence of a strong and independent communist China. His successors found that

(c) Soviet anxieties over China.

Starting from a less initially prejudiced position, the Russians show signs of developing their own neuroses over China. ~~Even in the honeymoon period of the early '50s Soviet attitudes to China were ambivalent.]~~ Chinese poverty made her an intolerably demanding ally; her potentialities made her a future rival. Present Soviet anxieties arise inter alia from China's vast and growing population, with its possible threat to the sparsely populated areas of Siberia; her nuclear development and military potentialities, coupled with the fear that the Chinese may in future be uninhibited in applying this military strength; her exploitation of nationalist and racial animosities, which has serious implications for a multi-national and multi-racial country such as the Soviet Union, as well as for Eastern Europe; and also Chinese pride and general intractability. There is an element of racial fear in the Soviet attitude, the sense of the Chinese as the 'yellow peril'. There is also a sense of superiority originally deriving from China's long stagnation and backwardness. Finally there is anger at the Chinese heresy and dismay at its challenge to Soviet

/leadership

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leadership of the World Communist Movement.

(d) Frontier disputes. The Sino-Soviet frontier in the North East of China along the Amur and Ussuri rivers and in the far west in Sinkiang is delimited by treaties imposed by the Russians in the 19th Century during a period of Chinese weakness and Western pressure with the result that large areas of what China regards as originally Chinese territory are in Soviet hands. The Chinese regard the treaties as "unequal". For historical reasons they are also specially sensitive to threats from across their northern land borders, the direction from which all permanent conquerors of the country have come. Their most important heavy industrial area, the North-East, lies close to the Soviet border as do many of their nuclear installations and mineral resources. The Soviet Union for their part no doubt see dangers in Chinese irredentism and population pressures. The Soviet Government shows every intention of maintaining the present frontiers while claiming the importance of taking practical steps to normalize the frontier situation. The Chinese have said that they are willing to take the treaties as the basis of determining the entire boundary line between the

and talks on the frontier question as a whole have recently opened in Peking, it remains to be seen whether the two sides are prepared to settle down to ^{this year} ~~negotiations~~ ^{negotiation} to facilitate negotiations.

(e)

Soviet Union and China and for settling all existing questions relating to the boundary, provided the Soviet Government will recognise the treaties as unequal; but that if the Soviet Government maintains its present stand the Chinese Government will have to reconsider its position as regards the Sino-Soviet boundary question as a whole. The Chinese attitude is not therefore openly irredentist though the threat is present and there have been dark references by Chinese leaders, notably by Mao in 1964 speaking to visiting Japanese Socialist party members, when he said that the account for the lost territories in the North would have to be presented one day. The frontier has been the scene of repeated armed clashes.

Though ^{this year} there have ~~recently~~ been limited negotiations on river navigation ~~there seems no disposition to settle down to serious negotiation~~ on the main issues.

Position of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic. Soviet influence over the Mongolian Peoples's Republic is important for the security of the exposed Soviet lines of communication south of Lake Baikal. There is no hard evidence that the Chinese are anxious to re-establish their former sovereignty over this area but the reintroduction of Soviet troops into

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Mongolia in 1967 indicates that the Soviet Government is taking no chances.

(f) Chinese resentment at Soviet policies towards China. Reviewing the history of their relations with the Soviet Union, the Chinese would have no difficulty in detecting the ambivalence of Soviet attitudes and seeing the Russians as doubtful or false friends from the start. While purporting to renounce all privileges enjoyed in China by the Tsarist Government, the Soviet Government clung on to their concessions ~~as long as~~ possible and have still not renounced territory acquired under unequal treaties, e.g. those of 1858 and 1860. Chinese weakness has been frequently exploited for Soviet ends, e.g. Chinese recognition of the independence of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic secured by Stalin at the end of the Second World War. Soviet aid to China was cautious, even niggardly. Information on nuclear weapons and delivery systems was withheld. The ~~with-~~^{departure} drawal of Soviet technicians in 1960 was a serious blow to the Chinese economy. As seen by the Chinese, the Soviet Union first failed to give China adequate diplomatic support, e.g. over the off-shore islands and the frontier dispute with India, and rapidly passed into active collaboration with the Americans to contain China.

*The Russians claim
they were expelled.
The departure of
had serious
consequences for ...*

(g) Diplomatic Rivalry. The Soviet Government are concerned to limit the spread of Chinese influence and to develop their own influence, particularly in countries bordering on China. They have sought to dissuade the Canadians, Belgians and Italians from recognition of China. The central theme of Chinese foreign policy on the other hand is the fight against the two great powers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, who are trying to hem China in. The Chinese seek to discredit the Soviet leaders, to stir up opposition to them [inside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe] and to undermine their influence [elsewhere]. The Chinese are particularly interested in excluding Soviet, as any foreign, influence in South and South-East Asia and from countries on China's perimeter, e.g. North Korea. The Chinese also harbour long-term ambitions for bringing Japan under their influence and are particularly sensitive to recent improvements in Soviet/Japanese relations.

(h) Differences over Vietnam. The Chinese regard Vietnam as a test-case for the validity of their doctrine of revolutionary war and, within the limits imposed by the need to retain their influence with the North Vietnamese, continue to urge them to "protracted struggle". The Soviet

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Union have used their influence for a negotiated settlement. Each wishes to reduce or exclude the other's influence in Hanoi and disputes have also arisen over the transport of Soviet aid to North Vietnam across China.

(i) Differing tactics in the Third World. Here the Chinese have advocated a more militant line, placing emphasis on revolutionary war and presenting China as a model for the world's "rural areas". In the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement the Chinese have used racialist arguments and sought to exclude the Russians as white and European. The Soviet Union has been more cautious, cultivating and giving aid to bourgeois nationalist leaders. Soviet propaganda has exploited China's interference in the internal affairs of other countries and their inability to give large scale aid. China has criticised the Soviet aid programmes for the luxury in which Soviet experts live while abroad, their failure to complete aid projects and their arrogant behaviour.

Inter-party issues

5. Here the main factors are:

(a) Differing origins of the two parties.

The Russian Revolution was a revolution of the urban proletariat and in the Western tradition. The Chinese Revolution was peasant in

/origin


list
in his relations with
it ruthlessly pursued

origin. Mao's course to power was heretical. He owes as much to Chinese tradition as to Western revolutionary learning.

(b) Historically bad relations between the two parties. Party relations have shown strains similar to those in state relations. Stalin ~~was~~^{in all} determined to keep the Chinese Communist Movement under his control, mis-understood it and ~~ruthlessly subordinated it to~~ Soviet interests. Soviet advice was sometimes disastrous (e.g. in 1927) and always selfish. The Chinese Communists came to power by their own efforts and in spite of Stalin.

(c) Doctrinal differences. Doctrinal differences between the two parties, implicit from the outset, developed openly in the nineteen fifties. They disagreed inter alia on the nature of the present era; on the building of Communism (the Chinese claiming that the communes made its realization possible in the near future and the Russians scouting this claim); on the prospect of a peaceful transition to Socialism (the Chinese ~~in contradiction of the Soviet Union~~ asserting that while theoretically possible it never happened in practice); on the inevitability of war and the dangers presented by nuclear weapons (the

/Soviet



Soviet Union here amending Lenin and arguing that nuclear weapons required the prevention of war, the Chinese ~~denying~~ ~~deserving~~ that nuclear weapons have brought a qualitative change to modern warfare and accusing the Russians of imposing a ban on revolution); on their attitude to Stalin (Mao did not approve of Kruschev's iconoclasm); on the continuance of class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat (the Chinese claiming that only when the state withered away in the Communist millennium would it be possible to speak of a classless society, that dictatorship of the proletariat must continue and that the Soviet concept of the state of the whole people was a revisionist invention).

(d) The Cultural Revolution. The doctrinal differences reached their culmination in the Cultural Revolution and the supporting philosophy developed by the Chinese: that class-struggle persisted under Socialism and unless revisionist tendencies were dug out, a capitalist restoration was likely; that such a degeneration had in fact occurred in the Soviet Union; that a Cultural Revolution was therefore necessary if Socialist development and ideological purity were to be maintained. The Cultural Revolution

/further

further deepened the schism by imposing the absolute supremacy of Mao's thought and by involving highly unorthodox tactics, attacking the party machinery and relying on the army. In October 1966 Brezhnev said that events in China had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. In March 1967 he likened the intervention of the Peoples' Liberation Army to a "reactionary military coup". On the Chinese side, the Cultural Revolution, as a crusade "to dig out the roots of revisionism", has an in-built anti-Soviet aspect.

(e) Struggle for leadership of the World Communist Movement

Chinese claims that Mao is the only true heir of Lenin ("the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era") involved the claim to leadership of the World Communist Movement. This has involved not only polemics between the protagonists but also a struggle for support among other Communist parties and Left Wing groups throughout the world.

B. The Present Position

6. Until September the dispute in 1969 was more rancorous than ever before. Each side conducted intensive propaganda against the other. The Chinese accused the Soviet leaders of betraying Communism, of restoring capitalism,

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capitalism, of counter-revolutionary activities and conspiracy with the United States. The Soviet leaders accused the Chinese of war-mongering, of unbridled nationalism and of adventurism. There was an impressive build-up of Soviet forces in the border areas. On the frontier there were serious clashes and in August a warning by the Soviet Union that if war broke out it would involve the use of nuclear weapons. As regards the international Communist Movement, the Soviet Union has not tried formally to excommunicate China, nor have the Chinese sought to set up a new international movement. Each side wishes to put the onus of declaring a formal schism on the other, though the schism in fact already exists. As regards state relations, the two sides maintain minimal diplomatic contacts and the Soviet/Chinese Treaty of 1950 remains undenounced. There is also some surviving trade. But there has been open detestation between the two sides.

7. September, however, brought a change in the situation. In that month Kosygin, returning from Ho Chi-Minh's funeral in Hanoi, paid a brief visit to Peking where he met Chou En-lai. Shortly afterwards agreement to open frontier talks was announced and the talks are now in progress in Peking. It is too early to estimate their significance. Chinese motives in agreeing to hold talks may have been a mixture of genuine fear of a Soviet military attack and a realisation that Kosygin's

/readiness

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readiness to come to Peking had put them temporarily at a disadvantage in the propaganda war. The Soviet Government presumably wished to display their reasonableness. Both sides probably wish to avoid a further escalation in the quarrel. It seems unlikely that the talks will effect any radical change in the course of the dispute though they have already lowered the tension on the frontiers.

8. Is the dispute likely to lead rapidly to full-scale hostilities ? Probably not, though firm prediction is difficult. The Chinese are aware of the Soviet Union's vast superiority in weapon power, have hitherto moved cautiously and will probably continue to do so. Nor would an aggressive war against the Soviet Union be consistent with either the military or political traditions of China. The Chinese leaders may, however, see tension in the North as a useful political weapon for internal use both as a practical demonstration of the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union and as a convenient way of promoting internal unity. They may therefore wish to maintain a degree of tension and there is always a risk that incidents could escalate beyond control. The Soviet Union for their part may be tempted to use their present military superiority in order to administer a serious military defeat on the Chinese, possibly by a punitive expedition rather in the style of the Sino/Indian War of 1962. They may be more tempted to carry

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out a "surgical strike" against Chinese nuclear installations. This is a risk which cannot be entirely discounted. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders probably realise that a punitive expedition or a "surgical strike" could not be kept as a limited operation and would involve them in full-scale war, the outcome of which they could not foresee. It would unite the Chinese in resistance to the Soviet Union. It would also ensure lasting Chinese hostility and rule out any prospect of improved relations after Mao's death. Regard for foreign and international communist opinion may also operate as a restraint, as may the thought that a preemptive strike would set a dangerous precedent. Soviet relative caution hitherto suggests that the arguments for a full-scale attack have been considered and rejected. Kosygin's visit to Peking and the opening of frontier talks reinforce this

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? rough

theory. Soviet policy on the frontier seems likely to remain one of tough reprisal and deterrence coupled with offers to negotiate on Soviet terms.

9. A further feature of the present situation is the pressure on each side to guard its flank and to cast around for allies. On the Soviet side China has become a major preoccupation. This is presumably an important factor behind recent obscure Soviet proposals for regional economic co-operation and a security system in Asia. It is probably also a factor behind Soviet expressions of interest in better relations with the United States and improvements in European security. It is questionable whether the latter presage any given in the Soviet position though it is in Western interests to probe. Soviet propaganda also makes play of the possibility of a Peking/Washington and also of a Peking/Bonn axis. The Soviet leaders may genuinely regard these as potential threats. On the other side the Chinese in their isolated position are less able to seek allies. We should not entirely discount their public statement of November 1968 that Sino/U.S. differences were susceptible of a negotiated settlement, but given the Formosa problem any early progress on this front is unlikely.

C. Future course of the dispute

10. This is best examined under three heads:

- (a) the short-term prospect up to Mao's death;
- (b) After Mao's death;
- (c) In the long term, say for the next twenty years.

/During

During this period, and certainly for the period covered by (a) and (b), the main factor for change will probably be the character of the Chinese leadership. Soviet policy seems likely to follow more settled courses and present Soviet leaders may not be untypical of the Soviet leadership throughout the period under review.

Until Mao's death

11. While Mao is alive and sufficiently well to retain control of affairs the chances of ~~any substantial~~ ^{any} rapprochement are ~~very~~ ^{very} small. Anti-Revisionism has been an integral part of the Cultural Revolution which has been conducted personally by Mao and he is irrevocably committed to a tough anti-Soviet line. On the other hand, the factors militating against full-scale hostilities referred to in paragraph ^(s) ~~and 8~~ above will continue to apply. During this period the present situation is unlikely to change greatly.

After Mao's death

12. Here the situation will be more open and much will depend on the character of the new Chinese leadership. Maoism, whether in strong or diluted form, will probably remain as an established religion in China and Lin Piao, chosen for his loyalty to his master, is the designated heir. On the other hand, the excesses of the revolutionary movement under Mao may produce a reflux of feeling in China and Lin Piao by himself may be unable to maintain a strong Maoist line or even to retain sole leadership. He has so far existed under Mao's shadow, he lacks his master's charisma, and he is a sick man. There may therefore

therefore be a committee-type government in China, which could include more pragmatic elements. As well as the Maoist evangelical strain, Chinese Communism has shown a bureaucratic, mandarin tendency, represented by Liu Shao Ch'i, which may reassert itself. There is also evidence of a continuing body of more pragmatic thought among Chinese leaders up to 1966, which saw advantages in Soviet-style economic and military development and presumably favoured better relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Mao's death will give the Soviet leaders an opportunity of making gestures. They still claim that the majority of Chinese are good but misled. There will be pressures upon the Soviet Union from other Communist parties to make such gestures.

13. On the other hand, the scope for rapprochement is likely to be limited. The body of opposing doctrine which has now been built up gives a rigidity and a persistence to the ideological dispute which is independent of personalities. The struggle for the control of the world Communist movement is likely to continue. Almost all the grounds in the inter-state quarrel will survive, e.g. nationalism, frontier problems, diplomatic rivalry. Both sides having taken up an extreme public position will find it hard to withdraw from it; this will be particularly true of the Chinese. Probably the most that could happen would be a limited improvement in relations, e.g. ~~an tacit~~ agreement to reduce the level of invective and to avoid

major clashes on the frontier. Sino-Soviet trade might improve to the same extent. But anything more than superficial improvements seem unlikely. ~~A reversion to the 1950 honeymoon is out of the question.~~ Nor is it ~~in the least~~ likely that the Chinese would accept Soviet aid or military assistance even if it were offered.

14. It might be argued that the reversal in Soviet/German relations in August 1939 was of stunning rapidity. To most people it did so seem. But it had in fact been prepared by cautious soundings. It had been preceded by a change of Foreign Minister in the Soviet Union. It was made under the stress of a imminent war. It affected inter-governmental relations only. Inter-party relations were not involved. The Communist party of Germany had already been sacrificed. It was made possible by the nature of Stalin's unchallenged rule. There is at present no reason to think that the Soviet and Chinese leaders would be able to bring about a comparable change in their relations. Again, though there have been rapid fluctuations in Soviet/Yugoslav relations the area of dispute was much more limited.

Yugoslav pretensions and the threat from Yugoslavia, as seen by the Soviet Union, were less serious. ~~The parallel would be the case of a rebellious colony rather than of a world rival.~~

Long Term

Soviet-Yugoslav relations
Sino-Soviet relations are
not comparable

15. Here prediction becomes very hazardous. Probably the most that can be said is that the chances are that the dispute will grow less bitter. Provided the dispute is slightly

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coexistence

muted and the Chinese do not become obviously dangerous, the Soviet Union will be under pressure from other Communist parties to try to mend their fences with the Chinese and they will probably see it as in their interests to do so provided the price is not too high. Military factors will point in the same direction since by the late '70's the Chinese should be in a position to inflict serious missile damage on the Soviet Union. On the other hand the increased military power of China will not be such as to change radically the shape of the triangle Moscow-Washington-Peking. Moscow will retain a decisive edge over Peking in weaponry. Peking will remain for a very long time the weakest of the trio and for the Soviet leaders rapprochement with Peking will be no alternative to *coexistence* [accommodation] with Washington. The United States and the Soviet Union will have a continued and perhaps growing common interest as the only true super powers. One of these common interests may be a wish to exchange information on and guard against the Chinese nuclear and missile threat. This suggests that while the Soviet leaders may wish to reduce tension with China they will not be prepared to pay a very high price for it.

16. On the Chinese side economic development is likely in time to make China more "revisionist" and more responsible. Growing knowledge of nuclear weapons may have the same effect. The Chinese will probably remain, as now, cautious over critical issues of peace and war and demographic pressures^S are unlikely to

change this. There may therefore be increased common ground with the Soviet Union and some of the grudges against the outer world may have worn off as Chinese power increases. Chinese leaders may become increasingly pragmatic in their outlook. On the other hand, the internal political and economic problems of the country are so great that the Chinese are likely to be preoccupied, weakened and warped by them for a long period. Moreover, Chinese pride and isolationism will make the process of the emergence of China as a richer and psychologically better adjusted country a slow and painful process. For example, foreign aid will for long remain unacceptable. The fact that throughout this period Japan will far overshadow China in wealth will not help the Chinese overcome their neuroses. The grounds for dispute with the Soviet Union will survive throughout this period and it will require conscious effort on the part of Chinese leaders to avoid reverting to them and exploiting them. For these reasons dramatic changes in Sino/Soviet relations seem unlikely. The best forecast is for the dispute to survive though probably in a more muted form.

D. Significance of the dispute for the West

17. Here there are two main questions:

- (a) Whether the continuance of the dispute is on the whole to our advantage, and,
- (b) Whether there is anything the West can or should do to influence or exploit it.

18. As regards (a), on balance the answer is probably yes. It is true that the continuing isolation of China is a dangerous element in

but chiefly in the sense
that it is better to
have the Soviet Union
and China at odds
than actively linked
against us.

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the world and that in the long term we would hope to see a more civilised country emerging. It is also true that the threat of being out-flanked on the left by the Chinese has made the Soviet Union more "revolutionary" in certain aspects of its external policy than it would otherwise have been, and fear of China has made Soviet Eastern European policy more rigid. Moreover, the out-break of full-scale hostilities between the Soviet Union and China would have incalculable consequences and could not be said to be to the West's benefit. Nevertheless, the continuance of the dispute at its current level short of war, the present open [and scandalous] schism in the Communist world and the consequent diversion of Soviet and Chinese energy have been [a considerable] advantage to us. It is in our interest that Communism should be as fragmented and discredited as possible and in these fields Mao has done sterling work. The re-direction of Chinese trade to the West as a result of the breach has been to our advantage. Fears of China may have some value in stimulating Soviet/U.S. agreements, e.g. on arms. They may also [encourage] the Soviet Union to play a helpful rôle in Asia in trying to compose regional differences, e.g. between India and Pakistan. The dispute also gives the West some limited opportunities to play off one adversary against the other (see below). As regards the dangers of China's continued isolation, increased Chinese links with the West would be a safer corrective than a Sino/Soviet rapprochement.

and possibly an
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spheres of influence
leaving the Chinese a
fair hand in S.E.
Asia. This

seems to be

in the hope of
extracting

19. A Sino/Soviet rapprochement of a limited kind, as envisaged in paragraph 12 above, would not touch the underlying causes of the dispute. It might, however, restore some confidence to the Communist movement and reduce Soviet anxieties, thereby working to the detriment of the West. A major rapprochement, ~~might cause~~ involving say an agreed formula on doctrinal differences, a settlement on the frontiers, and some diplomatic co-operation would have much more serious effects. It would give a considerable impetus to the world Communist movement and could alter the diplomatic and strategic balance in Asia. The West would in many sectors again face a united Sino/Soviet bloc and though this might prompt a drawing together of Western and perhaps some neutral states the disadvantages would be overriding. However, for reasons given earlier in this paper such a ~~reconciliation~~ ^{reconciliation} ~~large scale rapprochement~~ is a remote contingency.

20. As regards (b) (what the West can do), there is little the West can do to influence the dispute, though U.S./Soviet agreements which are justified on grounds unrelated to China have the effect of confirming the Chinese in their antagonisms. As pointed out above, there are also openings, at least to the U.S., to exploit the dispute ~~and extract~~ Soviet concessions by suggestions of a rapprochement with China. But for the United States Peking will be no real substitute for Moscow (for the reasons given in paragraph 15 above). Formosa will probably

/remain a

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It seems probable, however, that Japan would find the Soviet Union a more promising economic partner if the territorial questions at issue between the two countries could be resolved.

Fast return Jap.
Dr. Minster on Sept 1
Stay in New York

Speculator

remain a barrier to substantially improved Sino/U.S. relations. Western European countries ~~that~~ which recognise Peking may be in a better position; and in the long run Western Europe may be able to contribute substantially to reducing China's isolation. But for Europe, as for the U.S., the card of flirtation with China is one to be used with great caution if it is not to be counter-productive as far as the Russians are concerned.

21. Japan also is in some respects well placed to establish a close trading and political relationship with China and play a major part in the development of China's potential. ~~It seems possible, however, that Japan may find the Soviet Union a more responsive and more influential neighbour.~~ The economic success of Japan, instead of offering China an acceptable and massive source of technological experience, may in fact serve to accentuate Chinese envy and determination to do everything for themselves whatever the cost and however long it takes.

~~Certainly closer Japanese relations with the Soviet Union would ^{probably} exacerbate China's grievance against the Russians.~~

22. Subject to the limited reservations above, the best course for the West is to avoid involvement in the dispute and confine itself to the rôle of ~~Speculator~~ tertius gaudens. Policy towards the Soviet Union and China should continue to be mainly decided on grounds unconnected with the dispute but care should be taken not to drive them into each other's

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arms. By reason of its greater power and proximity, the Soviet Union will continue to bulk larger in European calculations. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to become associated with the Soviet Union in clearly anti-Chinese moves, e.g. a security system in Asia, though if Soviet anxieties lead them to promote Asian regional co-operation and increase economic aid benefits could accrue to the West.

23. The considerations in paragraph 24 above apply also to U.K. policies.

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
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1 Mr. Mackintosh
2 Registry

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MR. CRADOCK

cc: Sir T. Brimelow
Sir E. Peck (o.r.)
Mr. Wilford



Sino/Soviet Dispute

I apologise for not sending comments on your draft planning paper by the deadline. There were some Assessments Staff comments and it is entirely my fault for having sat on them. Having missed the deadline, I will not now put them forward except to say that they were based on the attached paper approved by the JIC. I have, however, two general comments - one procedural and the other substantive.

2. The procedural comment relates to the degree of overlap between the JIC papers and the draft planning paper. It seems to us that the draft planning paper has indeed been written in the light of various JIC assessments. But at the same time we find it a little dispiriting that it should be necessary for the draft planning paper to go over so much of the ground covered and agreed inter-departmentally in two recent Assessments Staff papers. The first was MISC 237(69) 27. The Planning Staff are, of course, represented on the MISC Committee. The second, which was an evolution from the first, was the JIC paper already referred to (JIC(A)(69) 47 (Final)) and attached to this minute. Bearing in mind my experience in the FCO Planning Staff, it had been my hope that the Assessments Staff and the JIC could sometimes produce papers which would reduce the need for Planning Staff papers to devote much space to background and analysis, thus allowing them to concentrate on the definition of British interests and how they can be forwarded. I hope that in the future it may be possible to dovetail our work more closely and so avoid asking people to comment on or to read very similar analyses within a few weeks or months.

3. The substantive point is a suggestion for further work by the Planning Staff. We have assessed that a major Sino/Soviet conflict is unlikely, at any rate in the near future. However, it cannot be entirely ruled out that there might be a considerable conflict whether or not it qualified as "major". If it occurred, it might happen with little warning. A new and rather critical situation might then face us. Would it be worth thinking now about what our options would be in such a situation? For example, would it be a favourable opportunity for taking an initiative to promote closer Western European unity?

J.A. Thomson

Cabinet Office, S.W.1
5th November, 1969

(J.A. THOMSON)



SECRET - GUARD

C.3/14

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.



17th September 1969

96
Mr. Fletcher
Mr. Thompson

Dear John,

Sino-Soviet Relations

At today's CIA briefing for the Commonwealth Liaison Officers, a member of the Office of Strategic Research provided some information which adds to that contained in my letter C.3/14 of 16 September about the Sino-Soviet Dispute. I am writing to you about this rather than, in the usual way, to Brian Stewart and the other recipients of my weekly CIA briefing reports as the only points of interest from this particular briefing were concerned with your enquiry. May I leave it to you to decide what further circulation to give to this letter.

2. As the briefing officer mentioned the reference made by an Editor of "New Times" to "new weapons" when he spoke to an American Embassy official on, he gave the date, 4 September, I asked him what he thought these "new weapons" could be. He said he thought the Soviet editor must be referring to tactical nuclear weapons. However, he could have been referring to some new conventional weapon, possibly a controlled fragmentation weapon, like the cluster bombs being used by the Americans in Vietnam. These were regarded as new weapons by the Russians. He also mentioned that, after the Damansky incident, a Soviet diplomat in Laos had told an American official there that they had "shown the Chinese a new weapon or two" during this incident. Since we knew, the briefing officer said, nuclear weapons had not then been used, this supported the possibility that the Russians did not necessarily mean nuclear weapons when referring to "new weapons". However, he repeated, he thought the "New Times" man meant nuclears.

3. The briefing officer went on to say that a Soviet official at the United Nations had told an American official there, also on 4 September, that the Chinese were relying on two assumptions in their policy towards the Soviet Union. These were that the Russians would compromise in the long term on their territorial disputes and also the Russians would never use larger than tactical nuclear weapons in any military action against China. The Soviet diplomat apparently commented that the Chinese were wrong on both counts.

J.A. Thomson, Esq.,
Cabinet Office.

-1-

SECRET - GUARD

Friday 10/10/69
Mr. Thomson (S/1)
I am well aware that X
concerns with my first reaction.
E. Thomas
10/10/69



SECRET - GUARD

4. In answer to a question, the briefing officer said that if the Russians used nuclear weapons they could take out China's nuclear facilities in one day. If they used conventional weapons, the result would be "somewhat messy surgery" and they would have to make repeated passes over the targets, possibly lasting three to four days, in order to destroy them. We should, however, bear in mind in considering the possibility of a preventive strike against China that the Russians would never be able to be absolutely certain that the Chinese did not retain one bomber bearing one nuclear device, which they could use to drop on Vladivostock. His personal conclusion, and he stressed that this was not an Agency view, would be that, for this reason, the Russians were unlikely to make a preventive strike against China's nuclear installations.

5. I found this last comment of the briefing officer interesting as I had not heard it before. Also it was clearly connected with the paper which OSR were preparing about the feasibility of a preventive strike and about which I heard speaking to the Deputy Director of OSR over the telephone. (See my letter to Brian Stewart, C3/14 of 5 September). It could be therefore that the briefing officer was expressing OSR views as contained in their paper and not merely his own.

*Yours ever,
E. Bolland*

(E. BOLLAND)

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E.R.

Entered Reg.
X X 87
24/10

MR. MACKINTOSH

cc: Mr. Thomas
Mr. Staples

I attach a copy of a letter to me from Mr. Bolland with some further information about piece of intelligence on the Sino/Soviet dispute.

2. The explanation at the end of paragraph 5 seems highly unconvincing.

3. If you have any comments please let me know.

4. Mr. Staples may like to send copies to members of the Far East and East European CIGs.

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JAT

(J.A. THOMSON)

29th September, 1969

-2-

Mr. Thomas
Mr. Staples

I have given
copies of the
attachment to
Col Pett and
Mr Cambridge

Mr. Thomson
9/3/69

SL

Thank you for letting me see this. I agree with you that para 5 makes no sense at all in the context of new weapons. It seems to be as mystified as everyone else. I can only think that Bereszhkov may have been under instructions to float a rather extreme idea to the US to see what their reaction might be, e.g. to see if the US thought that the Russians were capable of using nuclear weapons against China; that is, to learn more about (which might be relevant to US attitudes to SALT) US views on the Soviet attitude to the Sino-Soviet confrontation than to pass on a serious message or warning. Otherwise, it might have been an equally obscure or tortuous KGB play !!

30 September 69.



BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRET - GUARD

(C.3/14)

16th September 1969

Dear John,

I spoke to [redacted] today about the information given to you by Chuck Peters on the Sino-Soviet Dispute and referred to in your letter of 11 September. Taking the cue in your PS, I began by referring to last week's Watch Report, saying that I had been rather mystified by its references to some Soviet officials and wondered if he could tell me who they were.

2.

3. I then put to [redacted] the questions in your third paragraph and asked if he could throw any light on them. He said that he did not know very much about Berezhkev. However, he could tell me that Berezhkev had been in touch with their people in Moscow on a number of occasions in the past. He had given them information which had proved reliable but, when I pressed him to tell me on which occasions these had been, he said (and I am not sure at all frankly) that he could not recall any particular case. He said quite firmly, however, that Berezhkev was not the sort of person who "peddled hokum".

4. Turning to what Berezhkev had said, [redacted] rather like you, put more weight on his protest about the leaks than on his comment about "Pravda's" final warning. [redacted] thought it was not difficult to understand why Berezhkev should have told their Embassy that the Russians did not like being cast in

J.A. Thomson, Esq.,
Cabinet Office.

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-1-
SECRET - GUARD



the rôle of people who were prepared to use nuclear weapons against a Communist and an Asian country. This would do their image no good, particularly in the third world. So for propaganda reasons if for no other, there was a sufficient explanation of why Berezhkev should protest to the Embassy about these leaks.

5. On the "final warning" said he had no adequate explanation to offer. With hindsight, he wondered however whether we might not now link Berezhkev's approach with Kosygin's meeting with Chou En-lai. The Russians certainly seemed to have been becoming increasingly worried that their relations with China were dangerously deteriorating and that, if some drastic step were not taken, a major conflict might ensue. Berezhkev could have been expressing such thoughts. However, when I asked why Berezhkev should have been chosen as the channel, if he had been, to put such a message to the Americans, said again he did not know. I asked him what he thought Berezhkev meant when he talked of "new weapons". said Berezhkev could have been referring to nuclear weapons, but it was conceivable he was referring to some new conventional weapons. When I asked him what he meant by this, said, not very explicitly or convincingly, that people who knew about these matters had talked of weapons which burst in the air causing many casualties. I said that this puzzled me as, from my experiences in the last war, air-bursts were nothing new and what he had said did not mean much to me.

6. After more general discussion which did not add to the above, said that if Berezhkev had in fact wanted to get a message to the President, or if someone had wanted to get a message to the President through him, they had in fact succeeded. The Agency had prepared a piece on this (presumably for the CIA's Daily Report for the President) which, although sceptical, made use of what Berezhkev had said and this piece may well have been read by the President. Also, as we had seen, it had got into the Watch Report.

7. I realise I have not provided you with conclusive answers to your questions. I had the impression that for some reason, possibly because, as mentioned, the report was State Department's and not the Agency's, was rather holding back. On the other hand, he did talk fairly freely and it may be that he also was rather in the dark as to why Berezhkev had made this particular approach. did say finally that the important thing was to know what had passed between Kosygin and Chou En-lai. Information about this should surely soon begin to leak out. A press report, which he had just seen, stated that Danesh Singh was now seeing Soviet leaders in Moscow

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/and and one could assume that the Indians were trying to find out what had passed between the Soviet/Chinese leaders. I said that we would be interested to hear anything the Agency heard about these talks in Peking and also about any other approaches the Russians might make to the Americans at any level about their relations with China. I hoped he would keep me informed.

said he would do what he could but I must realise when these reports were not theirs, we might have to look elsewhere, e.g. to the State Department. If Chancery or I hear anything more about Berezhkev's approach from the latter source, we will of course let you know.

Yours ever,
ddue

(E. BOLLAND)

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PS to MR Thomson

Yes

24/10

This came out for filming
today. I assume MR
Thomson did see Sir B.T.'s
minute?

AS

14/10

Received from Mr. Thompson
for filing MS
14/10.

This is v. interesting.
I think I will take towards
para 3 rather than
para 4. But it is a
nice choice! Would it
be worth commissioning
a full scale sic study
on this subject? Perhaps
Mr. Thompson would have
a word with me.

fig/s

~~Sir Robin Hooper, Mr
Mr. Thompson 10/14~~

~~Mr Lloyd-Jones~~

RT

Entd^{vt}
RT

Sir B. Trust my can

be seen either now or

O.R.

Personally I think he
answering his questions between
pages 3 & 4, which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.

~~Sir B. Trust - see.~~

RT

20/iii

62: Seems like a

coalition Government.

RT

22/6

22/6

E.R.

SIR R. HOOPER



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Alternative explanations of current Soviet foreign policy


The following personal note sets alternative explanations of recent Soviet foreign policy moves against each other in the hope that the confrontation may lead to a better understanding of the puzzling character of Soviet moves.

2. I begin by referring briefly to the moves in question. First of all, the Soviet attitude towards China seems a good deal sharper than the actual or potential Chinese threat warrants and I am including ideological considerations in this. Although the Chinese leaders may not wholly believe their own publicity they have been provided with a lot of evidence to substantiate their claim that the Soviet Union is preparing to make war on them. Secondly, the Russians have blown hot and cold on a number of matters affecting their relations with the U.S. Having radically changed course at the end of 1968 in favour of a joint US-USSR effort to bring about some Arab/Israel settlement the Russians are now seemingly content to let things coast, although the chances of achieving a settlement are thereby reduced. Similarly, having taken the plunge in principle on SALT and having shown a sense of urgency about it in the earlier part of this year the Russians are now stalling. Thirdly, the Russian attitude towards Germany is ambivalent. East Germany has been made to toe the line while gentle hints of improved relations have been held out to West Germany although the attitude of the latter is still denounced as a major threat to peace. Inducements to the West to attend a European Security Conference have been slightly improved. Fourthly, the Russians have taken a line towards Asian security questions which is both ambiguous and apparently unnecessary. Kosygin has made one proposal and Brezhnev another. They may be parts of a coherent whole but this is not apparent and the Russians are exposing themselves to rebuffs and charges of meddling. Finally, the Soviet attitude towards other Communist parties zig-zags oddly. In the summer of 1968 the Russians were taking a very harsh line exemplified by Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev doctrine. Within a few months the latter had been put under wraps and the Russians exposed themselves publicly to a good deal of criticism at a World Conference of Communist Parties which they did not need to hold. Since then the Eastern European countries have been allowed a larger degree of economic freedom, relations have been consciously fostered with the arch-heretic Tito, and the Chinese have been given plenty of ammunition to support their allegations of Soviet collusion with the capitalist-imperialist U.S.

3. The obvious explanation - and probably the right one - for what has undoubtedly been an unusual year for Soviet foreign policy is that the Russian leaders have decided that the overriding priority is to counter China. This would explain their harshness towards China and their relative mildness towards the U.S., Germany, and dissenting Communist parties as well as their attempts to build up a position in Asia. Conciliation of the West would have to be limited otherwise it might give the counter-productive impression that the Soviet Union was weak. Such a policy, primarily oriented against China, would have other advantages. For example, it would help to contain the risks that an Arab-Israel flare-up might lead to a US-USSR confrontation; it might place some inhibitions on the development of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; it might improve the electoral chances of the SPD. If this explanation is correct, we may expect that the Russians will be on the look-out to teach the Chinese a sharp lesson.

4. An alternative explanation might be that so far from being clear about their priorities the Russians are vacillating between different policies. According to this theory the Russians are tacking to and fro rather aimlessly instead of sailing a nicely calculated course close to the wind. This would explain the backing and filling of Russian policy towards the U.S. and the West in general, towards the ill-disciplined Communist parties and towards Asia. If this explanation is correct it is going to make it harder to predict the course of Soviet policy and it raises questions about the state of affairs within the Soviet leadership. There is very little evidence on the latter but what there is points to the conclusion that the main decisions have been taken collectively and the responsibility shared. Against this, it has to be remembered that the Soviet leaders are mostly mediocre men struggling with large problems. Some of them might well seek to explain and excuse their frustrations in terms of the shortcomings of some of their colleagues.

5. This personal note does not purport to analyse all the considerations involved in Soviet foreign policy. Its object is to draw attention to the state of affairs, to the probable explanation in paragraph 3 and to the conclusion at the end of that paragraph while at the same time bringing forward for consideration the possibility that there are considerable internal strains within the Soviet leadership.



18th August, 1969

(J.A. THOMSON)

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
The Co-ordinator

DGI

Sir T. Brimelow

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J. 332/8



38

UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE(NIE)

Title: THE USSR and CHINA
(SECRET - AUS/NZ/CAN/UK/US EYES ONLY)

Reference: NIE 11/13-69 dated 12th August 1969

1. Copies of the above document received through the JIC representative at the British Embassy, Washington, by direction of the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committees, have been distributed as follows:

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280A, GCHQ	16
GCO(L)	17
Chairman, JIC(B)	18
Assessment Staff	19
JIC Secretariat	20

2. Enquiries should be made to the Cabinet Office extensions 113 and 709.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

11th September 1969

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SECRET

nuclear weapons to do this. only comment to me when he put the telephone down was that it would be clear to me from what I had just heard that there were people in Washington who were taking the possibility of a preventive strike very seriously.

*Yours ever,
Eddie*

(E. BOLLAND)

cc C.N. Joslin, Esq.,
DIS/MOD

J.K.E. Broadley, Esq.,
PUSD, FCO.

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SECRET

(10/6)

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

CABINET OFFICE

J

10 SEP 1969

FILING INSTRUCTIONS

FILE No. 310/1....

5th September 1969

Dear Brian,

✓
This is a copy of
10/6

National Intelligence Estimate on
Sino-Soviet Relations

Fortunately, I was wrong in concluding in my letter 10/6 of 28 August that we would not be receiving copies of the NIE on this subject. Today, I was handed the usual 22 copies of NIE 11/13-69 of 12 August entitled "The USSR and China", 20 copies of which are on their way to you by air bag. Presumably, ~~he~~ did not refer to this Estimate when I spoke to him on 28 August because at that time the decision had not been taken to release it to us.

JIC REGISTRY

2. In any case, now that we have received the Estimate, you will, I think, find it extremely interesting. You will see that, on the much disputed question of the "surgical strike", the USIB have accepted the conclusion that: "While we cannot say it is likely, we see some chance that Moscow might think it could launch a strike against China's nuclear and missile facilities without getting involved in such a conflict i.e. prolonged and large-scale." I need not review the pros and cons as these are set out succinctly in the main body of the Estimate.

3. From all the discussions I have had on this subject in OCI, as I have already reported, the view held there is to stress that the Russians are most unlikely to launch such a preventive strike.

Yesterday, ~~he~~ again repeated this view, calling my attention to the enclosed copy of a broadcast from Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China of 29 August, which gave Moscow's public reaction to "imperialist propaganda" that Moscow was considering taking out China's nuclear bases and installations. ~~he~~ noted in particular the emphasis given to the point made by Brezhnev in his speech at the World Communist Conference that the Soviet Government's policy was based "on a long-term perspective and awareness that the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese people are identical." As the Estimate states and as ~~he~~ underlined, were the Russians to take action which resulted in war with China this would make reconciliation with China impossible for many years.

4. Nevertheless, there seems to be no doubt that the Americans are taking this even unlikely possibility quite seriously. When I was talking to ~~he~~ he broke off to speak to ~~he~~ Deputy Director of OSR, on the telephone. Referring to some meeting they had attended the previous day, ~~he~~ suggested to ~~he~~ that, in the paper he was preparing, they should consider precisely what actual facilities the Russians would have to take out in order to neutralise China's nuclear capabilities bearing in mind whether the Russians used conventional or

B.T.W. Stewart, Esq., CMG.,
Cabinet Office.

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Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China 1430 GMT 29 Aug 69 T

Anonymous commentary: "Imperialists Are Speculating on Maoists' Provocations"]

[Text] For a very long time the ruling cliques of imperialist countries have shown great interest in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations. This is natural because the fate of peace in the Far East and the world as well rests to a considerable extent on relations between the Soviet Union and China. In the early years of the People's Republic of China, ties of friendship and fraternal unity between the Soviet Union and China caused pessimism and disappointment for the imperialists. This, again, was natural. The fraternal Soviet-Chinese alliance, as a strong bastion of peace in the Far East and the world as a whole, shattered the aggressive schemes of imperialism, reactionaries, and militaristic forces.

It is entirely the fault of Mao Tse-tung and his closest associates that Soviet-Chinese ties have deteriorated and given rise to rejoicing among the imperialists. This is no cause of wonderment. Naturally, the Maoist leadership's policy, which leads to deterioration of Chinese ties with the Soviet Union, aggravation of tension in Soviet-Chinese border plagues areas, and armed provocations along the Soviet-Chinese border, pleases the imperialists exceedingly. The imperialist propaganda machine is taking advantage of the situation it is brought about by Mao Tse-tung and his closest associates to carry out various vilifications and instigations. The aim of this effort is obvious. Imperialist propagandists are working hard to aggravate the situation and to carve out a bottomless cleavage between the Soviet Union and China.

III. 2 Sep 69 96

A 2

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

For instance, in recent days imperialist propagandists have been fond of spreading the lie about Soviet readiness to deal a severe blow to Chinese nuclear bases and installations in Sinkiang and China's northwestern provinces. Such a provocative fabrication of the imperialist propaganda machine does not have, and could not have, any common ground with reality.

The Soviet Union and the Soviet people are preoccupied with the creative labor of communist construction. They have not attacked, nor do they intend to attack, anyone. The CPSU and the Soviet Government have always been and still are practicing Lenin's foreign policy toward China--a policy founded on the premise of basic and long-term interests of the Soviet and Chinese people. The CPSU and the Soviet Government, in the past and at present, have always been in favor of normalizing Soviet-Chinese relations and settling all border issues and differences through peaceful negotiations. This steadfast and principled stand of the Soviet Union was greatly amplified in the Soviet Government's statements 29 March and 13 June of this year as well as in the address to the Moscow world communist party conference CPSU secretary General Comrade Brezhnev.

Comrade Brezhnev pointed out in his address that the policy of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government is a principled and steadfast one based on a long-term prospective and awareness that the basic interests of the Soviet and Chinese people are identical. We have spared no efforts, past or present, to preserve the Soviet people's rapport with the fraternal Chinese people. Moreover, we believe that the Chinese people feel the same way toward the people of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Dear listeners, this is the reality of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government toward China. It completely shatters the imperialist propagandists' provocative fabrication about Soviet readiness to strike at Chinese nuclear centers and installations in Sinkiang and China's northwestern provinces.

Understandably, the capitalist countries' propagandists, who have sold their bodies and souls to world capitalism, are ready to fabricate lies of any degree of astonishment so as to please their masters. But the Maoist leadership itself is beyond understanding and shows itself to be far from guiltless. With their unbridled and criminal provocations against the Soviet Union the Maoists provide the imperialist anti-Soviet elements material for use in preparing their brew of vicious fabrications. What makes matters worse, however, is that imperialist propagandists are going all out to encourage Mao Tse-tung and his underlings in promoting their anti-Soviet frenzy and praise them for their actions. This citation by the imperialists exposes the ugly posture of Mao Tse-tung and his closest associates as deserters of the interests of the people of China, the Soviet Union, and the world.

MR E. Bolland's letter 10/6 dated 5 SEP 69
refers.

Date 10 SEP 69

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
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NIE 11/13-69

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(date) 10.2.05
(Signed) *CW*



310/1

Many thanks. Today's news of the Moscow/Chen
talks puts your crypted talk ahead of the American
one. Well done!

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Eg
12/9

I attach a copy of a minute by Mr. Lea of the Assessments Staff recording a probably unauthorised statement by me. I believe his confidence should be respected.

It is hard to know precisely what meaning or importance should be attached to the unusual communication made to the US Embassy in Moscow. For my own part, I am inclined to give as much weight to the protest about the US press stories as to the "final warning" to the Chinese. In my reading the US press stories are bound to have been taken by the Russians as mischief-making and irresponsible, vide the famous Pravda editorial of 28th August. At present, I do not think the reference to "new weapons" is to be relied upon as an indication of Russian military intentions. It may have been intended to scare the Americans into offering China further olive branches: it may even have been intended to persuade them to control the US press.

Although we have indirect indications that some people in the CIA strongly believe that the Russians intend to make a military strike against China soon, probably in the form of a "surgical" operation to take out the Chinese nuclear installations we are reliably assured that majority opinion in the CIA thinks this is unlikely. The NIE, which we have not yet been shown and probably will not now see does, however, in deference to the minority view, appear to include a judgment that such a Russian attack on China is not to be excluded.

My personal view is with the majority opinion in the CIA. Indeed, I would go further than perhaps they do and state my belief that the present Soviet leadership is very likely to conclude, after considering the question, that war with China is both unnecessary and against Soviet interests. This does not alter the view which I expressed on balance in my personal minute of 18th August to Sir R. Hooper that the Russians "will be on the look-out to teach the Chinese a sharp lesson". Such a lesson could be achieved through subversive, diplomatic or military means: if the latter, which is quite possible, it would be intended to stop short of war. But, as always, there could be a miscalculation.

J. A. Thomson
(J. A. THOMSON)

10th September 1969

c.c. Sir B. Trend
The Co-ordinator
DGI
Sir R. Hooper
Sir T. Brimelow
Mr. Giffard

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THOMSON/MACKINTOSH/Hunter

9.9.69

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(date) 10.2.05

(Signed) *Chas. Moore*


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91

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LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO.
OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME,
SACEUR, SACLANT, THE HAGUE,
WASHINGTON,
INFO NAMILCOM
TELNO JICTEL 621
DATED 4TH SEPTEMBER 1969
PRIORITY



NATO CONFIDENTIAL

THE FOLLOWING IS NATO VERSION OF SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE (PARAS 9, 10, 13, 14 OF WEEKLY SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE (JIC(69)(WSI) 36), DATED 4.9.69 SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE (NATO CONFIDENTIAL)

1. AN UNSIGNED LEADING ARTICLE IN +PRAVDA+ ON 28TH AUGUST CONSTITUTED ONE OF THE MOST VIGOROUS SOVIET ATTACKS ON CHINA THIS YEAR. IT ASSERTED THAT THE +ADVENTURIST+ FOREIGN POLICY BEING PURSUED BY CHINA WAS HEIGHTENING INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND ENDANGERING WORLD PEACE. IT ACCUSED CHINA OF MAKING ABSURD TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND ORGANISING BORDER PROVOCATIONS IN PURSUIT OF FAR REACHING GREAT POWER PLANS. IF A WAR SHOULD BREAK OUT IN PRESENT-DAY CONDITIONS, WITH THE EXISTING WEAPONRY, LETHAL ARMAMENTS AND MODERN METHODS OF DELIVERY, IT WOULD NOT SPARE A SINGLE CONTINENT.

2. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ARTICLE ARE IN LINE WITH PREVIOUS SOVIET ATTACKS, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH BREZHNEV'S SPEECH TO THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES. WESTERN PRESS REPORTS HAVE COUPLED IT WITH RUMOURS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE BEEN ASKING THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES AND COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE WHAT THEIR ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD EVER ATTACK CHINA.

3. PRESIDENT KEKKONEN OF FINLAND, WHO SPENT A SHORT HOLIDAY WITH MR. KOSYGIN A MONTH AGO, HAS TOLD HM AMBASSADOR, HELSINKI, THAT KOSYGIN HAD SAID NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT THERE MIGHT BE A REAL WAR BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE SITUATION ON THE SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER. KEKKONEN DID NOT BELIEVE

/THE PRESS

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE PRESS REPORTS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CONSULTED THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE IN THE EVENT OF WAR: HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE GIVEN THE STORY TO THE PRESS THEMSELVES, IN ORDER TO FRIGHTEN THE CHINESE.

4. WE SEE NO REASON TO CHANGE OUR PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR WAR BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN THE NEAR FUTURE IS SMALL. FRONTIER INCIDENTS, SOME LARGE, WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE AND CHINA MAY EVEN BE TEMPTED TO INCREASE THE PROVOCATIONS AS THE LENIN CENTENARY (SPRING OF 1970) APPROACHES. BUT SHE DOES NOT HAVE THE MILITARY STRENGTH TO LAUNCH A FULL-SCALE WAR WITH THE SLIGHTEST HOPE OF WINNING IT. THE SOVIET LEADERS MUST CALCULATE THAT THE CHINESE THREAT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE WILL BE SMALL. THE BALANCE MIGHT IN SOVIET EYES BE ALTERED WHEN THE CHINESE ARE IN A POSITION TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKE: FROM THE STRICTLY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW THEREFORE, THE IDEA OF A PREEMPTIVE SOVIET STRIKE NOW MIGHT BE A TEMPTATION. BUT ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND DAMAGE HER STANDING ELSEWHERE. ON THE WHOLE, SOVIET INTERESTS WOULD THEREFORE APPEAR TO ARGUE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF RESTRAINT.

5. HOWEVER THE INTENSITY OF THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA RESPONSE TO THE RECENT COMPARATIVELY MINOR BORDER INCIDENTS SUGGESTS THAT THERE ARE FACTORS IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO CHINA OF WHICH WE ARE UNABLE TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT. THIS SETS LIMITS TO OUR CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF ANY ASSESSMENT BASED ON PURE LOGIC AND THE COLD BALANCE OF SOVIET INTERESTS. WE CANNOT, THEREFORE, ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME CHINESE INITIATIVE WILL CAUSE DISPROPORTIONATE (THOUGH PROBABLY NON-NUCLEAR) SOVIET REACTION.

ENDS

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28th August 1969

Secretary

Dep Sec

Asst Sec


Mr Stewart

~~10/6~~ **REGISTRY** In my letter 10/6 of 5 August I said I would try to watch the progress of this NIE. It is now clear from what I have heard from one or two people in the Agency that the NIE has been completed and approved by the USIB. Unfortunately, as you will see from what follows, it is unlikely it will be released to us.

2. I called on Deputy Director of ONE, this morning and, without saying specifically that I knew about this NIE, I asked him whether they had produced any recent estimate on Sino-Soviet relations. He was very cagey, not saying either that they had a recent NIE or not. He merely said that there was nothing very new or extraordinary in the current view in the community on this question. I said I had been reading carefully what recent Watch Reports had been saying on this subject and he said that this line had not substantially changed. The accepted view remained that Russia was unlikely to initiate any major military action against China for the next few months. This conclusion covered also the suggestion made by, as he described them, "some of those who know Russia best", that the Russians were preparing for a "surgical strike" against Chinese nuclear facilities. One important reason why he thought this was unlikely was the nature of the present collective leadership who, he thought, would be most unlikely to reach such a decision. However, because of the strong views held by some members of the community on the possibility of a preventive strike and because of all that had taken place during the past few months between China and Russia, they had thought it advisable, however implausible it might seem, not to exclude the possibility that Moscow was preparing for all contingencies.

3. Just before calling on I spoke to about this question, referring in particular to the enclosed article by Chalmers Roberts from today's "Washington Post". I said that I had not heard anything of the reports referred to by Roberts at the beginning of his article about the discreet

B.T.W. Stewart, Esq., CMG.,
Cabinet Office.





enquiries the Russians were said to have made of some communist leaders in both Eastern and Western Europe on what the reaction would be to a Soviet preventive strike. said that they had some time ago received a rather vague report along these lines which they had tried, but without success, to confirm. They had therefore treated it with all reserve. I then asked whether they had a recent NIE on Sino-Soviet relations. Presumably, assuming that we would be receiving copies, he said that the NIE had been completed and, as far as he knew, agreed. I then asked him whether he knew anything about the National Security Council study on Sino/Soviet relations and US reactions to them mentioned in Roberts' article. said confidentially that he had, in fact, attended a meeting last Monday to discuss a State Department draft of such a paper prepared for the NSC. He was not prepared to tell me anything about its contents apart from saying that it naturally took the latest NIE as its starting point. However, from some general discussion it was clear that he also did not expect any major Russian military move against China, nor much less share the view that the Russians were likely to launch a "surgical strike". But he thought we might well see a number of incidents along the frontier similar to that of 13 August.

4. As far as the NIE is concerned, in view of careful reluctance even to refer to it, we must conclude that it is unlikely we shall receive copies. is, however, aware of our interest in the subject and he said that if there were any major changes in their thinking he would let me know.

5. I should perhaps also add to the last sentence of paragraph 3 of my last letter under reference where I said that the only person in CIA who, to my knowledge, had put forward the idea of a preventive strike, was a member of DDP. I have since learned that a member of ONE in fact drafted an internal memorandum arguing this thesis some weeks ago and that this was largely responsible for starting the debate in the intelligence community about the possibility of the Russians taking such action.

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Yours ever,
John
John
(E. BOLLAND)

cc C.N. Joslin, Esq., DIS/MOD
J.K.E. Broadley, Esq., PUSD

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FM JIC LONDON

DTG (GMT) 1345 25.8.69

TO NATO, ANKARA, BRUSSELS, BONN,
CINCHAN, COPENHAGEN, LISBON,
LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA,
REYKJAVIK, ROME, SACEUR, SACLANT,
THE HAGUE AND WASHINGTON
INFO NAMILOM
TELNO. JICTEL 588
DATED. 25 AUGUST 1969
PRIORITY

TOD (GMT) 1410 25.8.69

**N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L**

JICTEL 588

DATED 25 AUGUST 1969.

THE FOLLOWING IS NATO VERSION OF (TITLE OF FULL VERSION SINO-SOVIET BORDER REFERENCE NO. OF FULL VERSION WSI 34 PART II, 14-15.)
THE FOLLOWING ITEM OF INTELLIGENCE DATED 25 AUGUST 1969 IS FOR NATO.
SINO-SOVIET BORDER (NATO CONFIDENTIAL)

THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF FURTHER INCIDENTS SINCE THAT OF 13TH AUGUST ON THE BORDER BETWEEN SINKIANG AND KAZAKHSTAN.
NEITHER SIDE HAS INDULGED IN PROPAGANDA AS HYSTERICAL AS THAT WHICH FOLLOWED THE MAJOR INCIDENTS LAST MARCH, THOUGH PROTEST RALLIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED FROM MANY AREAS OF CHINA. THE CHINESE HAVE ALSO PROTESTED TO THE RUSSIANS, IN A NOTE DELIVERED ON 19TH AUGUST, ABOUT A LARGE NUMBER OF BORDER INCIDENTS WHICH THEY CLAIM HAD BEEN CREATED BY THE RUSSIANS DURING JUNE AND JULY. THE CHINESE APPEAR GENUINELY APPREHENSIVE OF THE RUSSIANS' INTENTIONS, AND BOTH RUSSIANS AND CHINESE SEEM CONCERNED TO STRESS PUBLICLY THE OTHER SIDE'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TENSION AND THEIR OWN REASONABLENESS. THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER INCIDENTS HOWEVER REMAINS STRONG, BOTH IN THE SINKIANG-KAZAKHSTAN AREA, WHERE THE RECENT INCIDENT TOOK PLACE, AND IN THE FAR EAST.

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5th August 1969



National Intelligence Estimate on
Sino/Soviet Relations

Following up a hint given to me before I went on leave a fortnight ago, I called on ~~Dear friend~~ who is responsible for Sino/Soviet affairs in ONE, this morning, to try to find out whether an NIE on this subject was in fact in preparation.

2. During our conversation, ~~He~~ admitted that, although he said he should not disclose this to me, he was currently engaged in drafting an NIE which would deal with the Soviet Union's obsession with the China threat and its implications for Soviet policies in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. He said he did not know whether this NIE would eventually be released to us and asked me to respect his confidence.

3. I was not able to obtain any detailed indication of the line the NIE might take. ~~He~~ did, however, say that, although this might seem surprising, certain people "in this building" were convinced that the Soviet Union was preparing itself for a "surgical strike" into Sinkiang to take out the nuclear facilities there. He himself clearly did not accept this view. He said that, if for no other reason, the present Soviet leadership would hardly embark upon such a venture whose outcome they could not possibly foresee. They would certainly find it extremely difficult to limit or to extricate themselves from any serious military penetration into China. (Incidentally, the only person in CIA I have heard put forward the idea of a preventive strike was a senior member of DDP.)

4. ~~He~~ did, however, draw my attention to the enclosed monitoring report (FBIS Daily Report on the Soviet Union of 17 July) of a broadcast on the Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian on 4 July. He said he had not seen any previous or similar reference to "hundreds and thousands of troops in the district, complete detachments" having volunteered to be sent to the Far East. Those who were arguing that Moscow had aggressive intentions against China had seized on this report as important evidence to support their contention. ~~He~~ did not agree with them. This was in fact only a single report and he himself was inclined to include it as part of the tremendous propaganda campaign the Soviet authorities had waged since the Ussuri incident to show that the present Chinese regime constituted a real military threat to the Soviet Union.

B.T.W. Stewart, Esq., CMG.,
Cabinet Office.



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5. Unfortunately, [redacted] is being transferred from his desk in ONE at the end of this month. I asked him if the NIE would be finalised by then. He did not answer directly but simply said that considerable interest was being shown in it by people on high. As this NIE could have implications for US policies towards the Soviet Union, it may be classified No Foreign. I will, however, try to watch its progress and see if I can learn anything more about it.

Jos. B.
ddie

(E. BOLLAND)

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cc C.N. Joslin, Esq., MOD, DIS.
J.K.E. Broadley, Esq., PUSD.

MINSK MILITARYMEN REQUEST DUTY IN FAR EAST

[Editorial Report--L] Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian at 1225 GMT on 4 July carries a live broadcast of a meeting in Minsk devoted to the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Belorussia from the German invaders. One of the speakers at the meeting is the commander of the Belorussian military district, Col Gen Ivan Moyseyevich Trettyak. In the course of his speech, General Trettyak says: "The soldiers and NCO's, officers and generals, in profound indignation brand with infamy the adventurist policy and military provocations of the Mao Tse-tung gang on the Soviet frontier. Guided by the requirements of military duty, hundreds and thousands of troops in the district, complete detachments, have applied to the command with a request that they be sent to the Far East and to the places where the Maoists are threatening the peaceful creative work of our people."

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18th April 1969

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21 APR 1969	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE No. 310/1 ✓	

SINO-SOVINER DISPUTE

(Previous Reference: JIC(A)(69) 15th Meeting, Minute 3)

In consequence of the reference the Secretariat has examined its records of the past two years for items concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In view of the expectation that the Assessments Staff will be called upon to assist Sir Denis Greenhill's conference it is suggested that these items should be examined and supplemented or weeded as appropriate so that the material available to the conference may be as comprehensive and relevant as possible. The items are readily available to the Secretariat.

It would also seem to be appropriate for the Assessment Staff to prepare an up to date assessment of the dispute in view of the imminence of the meeting.

P.E.C. HARRIS
for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committees

Mr. J. Thomson
Chief of Assessments Staff

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FOLIO

J 310/1

11th April 1969



...
I attach a copy of the Chinese Embassy special supplement to their weekly bulletin which covers their version of the recent border clashes.

I drew JIC's attention to this pamphlet yesterday in the context of discussion in the Weekly Survey of the relative silence of the Chinese propaganda machine compared with the strident noise made by the Soviets. I am not following the matter deeply myself, but clearly if the Embassy in London finds it worthwhile to publish so carefully compiled and well printed a document, although admittedly in Chinese language only, there may be cause for suspecting that their propaganda campaign is more energetic than we have assumed.

In any case the pictures and maps are of some interest.

I am copying this letter to Alastair Hunter in the Assessments Staff.

(B.T.W. STEWART)

Colonel C.L. Sayers,
Ministry of Defence (DI 2),
Main Building,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

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FROM:- SURV. SEC. SHAPE
TO:- JIC LONDON
TELNO:- SHP Ø636 INTEL
DATED:- 29TH MARCH 1969
PRIORITY

DTG:- 1000 (GMT) 29/3/69
TOR:- 1330 (GMT) 29/3/69



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FOR SECRETARY JIC FROM ACOS INT.
REQUEST JIC NOTE JIC(A) (69) (N)47 FORCE LEVELS ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER BE RELEASED TO NATO. SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE HAS RAISED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST HERE. THE MATERIAL IN THE NOTE WOULD BE VALUABLE FOR BRIEFING AND ANSWERING QUESTIONS.

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FM DELHI MAR21/69 SECRET

TO EXTER 913 PRIORITY

INFO LDN TT PARIS NATO MOSCO ISBAD BE LDN WSHDC CANFORCEHEB BE OTT
BAG STKHM WSAW BE LDN HKONG CNBRA TOKYO WLGIN BE OTT

REF OURTELS 838 MAR14 AND 889 MAR20

SINO SOVIET TENSION-MARSHALL GRECHKOS AND GOI REACTIONS


AT DINNER LAST NIGHT INDIAN ARMY CHIEF GEN KUMARAMANGALAM TOLD ME
THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO DELHI SOVIET MARSHALL GRECHKO HAD HAD
ONLY ONE PREOCCUPATION-TO CASTIGATE COMMUNIST CHINA AS EVERYBODYS
PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE.GRECHKO HAD SAID QUOTE OF COURSE WE CAN
HANDLE THEM ANY TIME UNQUOTE.

2.I ASKED KUMARAMANGALAM WHETHER HE BELIEVED GRECHKOS BOAST.HE
REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS TRUE ENOUGH NOW BUT WAS NOT/NOT SO
SURE ABOUT THE FUTURE,IE AFTER CHINAS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS BETTER
DEVELOPED.THIS IS AN INTERESTING INDICATION THAT THE INDIAN ARMY
CHIEF DOES NOT/NOT ENTIRELY RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET PRE-
EMPTIVE STRIKE.

3.GOI AND TIBETANS IN INDIA HAVE NOTED WITH INTEREST THAT SOME RECENT
SOVIET MAPS APPARENTLY SHOW TIBET COLOURED DIFFERENTLY FROM CHINA BUT
SO FAR AS WE KNOW THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO OFFICIAL SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT
ON PRESENT STATUS OF TIBET AND IT MAY BE NOTHING MORE THAN A COUNTER
TO CHINESE PROPAGANDA MAPS CLAIMING LARGE SECTIONS OF SOVIET TERRI-
TORY.

4.WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR PEGOC IN MOSCO FOR CONSULTATIONS AND INDIAN

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Dr. Thackeray
Dr. Radhakrishnan

PAGE TWO 918 SECRET

AMBASSADOR BHAR COMING HERE FROM MOSCO GOI DEBATE OVER HOW TO REACT IS PROCEEDING FURIOUSLY WITH SOME LEAKAGE TO DIPLOS AND PRESS. PUPMG TOGETHER ALL WE HAVE HEARD THERE APPEAR TO BE CONFLICTING CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS DEBATE WITHIN GOI. THOSE WHO NORMALLY LIKE TO TAKE A PRO-SOVIET STANCE ARE ALSO THOSE WHO IN THIS CASE HAVE BEEN MANOEUVERING FOR A DIALOGUE WITH CHINA WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE SPOILED IF GOI GAVE ANY SUPPORT TO USSR ON THIS ISSUE. THERE ARE ALSO MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT GIVING ANY MORE THAN PRIVATE SYMPATHY TO USSR AT A TIME WHEN SOVIET TANKS, AMMUNITION AND AIRCRAFT SPARES FOR PAK HAVE BEEN MUCH IN THE NEWS. WHILE GOI HAVE NO/NO INTENTION OF OVER-REACTING TO CLOSER SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PAK AND WHILE SOVIET FRIENDSHIP REMAINS A NECESSITY BECAUSE OF INDIAS EXPOSURE TO CHINA, GOI SEE NO/NO REASON AT THIS TIME TO RISK INCIDENTS ON THEIR OWN BORDERS WITH CHINA BY GIVING OVERT SUPPORT TO USSR. ANY THOUGHT OF GIVING SUCH SUPPORT WILL PROBABLY HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE BY SOVIET HINTS OF POSSIBLE NUCLEAR RETALIATION AGAINST CHINA WHICH INDIAN WOULD OF COURSE NOT/NOT WISH TO ENCOURAGE IN ANY WAY.

GEORGE

What?

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FM MOSCOW MAR 15/69 CONF

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- 1 APR 1969
PENNING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO 310111

TO TI EXTER 672 PRIORITY DE LDN

INFO LDN TT WSHDC PARIS CANDELNATO BONN BRU HAGUE ROME DELHI
DE LDN TT TOKYO HKONG CNBRA WLGTN DE OTT TT BGRAD WSAW DE PARIS
TT STKHM DE HAGUE

REF CURTEL 660 MAR 13

SOVIET VIEWS ON SINO-SOVIET TENSION

AT LUNCH IN RESIDENCE YESTERDAY FOR KC BROWN SOVIET OFFICIALS
TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE CHINA QUESTION WITH US. HEAD OF SECOND
EUROPEAN DIV, MAKEEV, (WHO HAD APPARENTLY SERVED IN CHINA IN
FIFTIES) SAW PROBLEM AS PRIMARILY LONG-TERM ONE AND DID NOT/
NOT SEEM TO THINK IT WOULD EXPLODE INTO MAJOR WAR. NEVERTHELESS
HE (AS WELL AS OTHER OFFICIALS) CONFIRMED THAT INCIDENTS HAD TAKEN
PLACE IN PAST AND THEY WOULD NOT/NOT BE SURPRISED IF THERE WAS
CONTINUATION AND POSSIBLY SOME ESCALATION IN FUTURE. MAKEEV SAID
SPECIFICALLY THAT SITUATION ON FAR EASTERN FRONTIER WAS NOT/
NOT LIKELY TO BE SOLVED EASILY AND THAT IT POSED A LONG-TERM
PROBLEM OF CONSIDERABLE MAGNITUDE.

2. SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE OF SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS HAS SIGNIFIC-
ANTLY DECREASED OVER PAST FEW DAYS - SUGGESTING THAT IF RUSSIANS
ARE SERIOUSLY PREPARING FOR FURTHER ACTIONS AGAINST CHINA THEY
ARE CERTAINLY TAKING FEW STEPS TO PREPARE THEIR POPULATION
PSYCHOLOGICALLY.

3. ATTACKS ON CHINA CONTINUE BUT THESE ARE BASICALLY CRITICISMS
OF CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS NOT/NOT QUESTIONS OF BILATERAL

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PAGE TWO 672 CONFIDENTIAL

CONTINUED LENGTHY ARTICLES ON FAILURE OF MARXIST INTERNAL STABILIZATION PUBLISHED IN KOMMUNIST NO. 4 AND MAR 12 IZVESTIA WHICH WE WILL REPORT IN OUR REGULAR PRESS SURVEY). APART FROM REPORTS OF FOREIGN PRESS REACTION TO MAR 2 INCIDENT, (STRESSING CLOSE RELATION BETWEEN FRG AND CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS), COMMENT ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS ADDS LITTLE SUBSTANTIAL TO MARSH MARSH PRAVDA EDITORIAL. MAR 13 PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON VIETNAM HOWEVER TOOK FURTHER STRONG SWIPE AT CHINESE. QUOTE PEKING LEADERS SHOWED ONCE MORE (BY FRONTIER PROVOCATION) HOW LOW THEY HAVE FALLEN POLITICALLY AND HOW FAR THEY HAVE GONE AS TRAITORS OF FORCES OF WORLD SOCIALISM IN ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE UNQUOTE.

4. EDITORIAL IN LATEST ISSUE OF NEW TIMES IN ADDITION SERVED MILD STRATEGIC WARNING TO CHINESE: PEKING'S AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICY TESTIFIED NOT/NOT ONLY TO CHINESE CHAUVINISM BUT ALSO TO QUOTE THEIR LACK OF COMMON SENSE IN THE EVALUATION OF THEIR OWN FORCES AND POTENTIALITIES ON THE ONE HAND AND THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE OTHER UNQUOTE. ALTHOUGH WARNINGS ARE SERVED, BORDER REGION IS APPARENTLY STILL TENSE AS EVIDENCED BY MONGOLIAN MFA NOTE TO CHINESE (PUBLISHED IN MAR 13 PRAVDA) PROTESTING QUOTE GRAVE POLITICAL PROVOCATION UNQUOTE BY CHINESE IN DETAINING MONGOLIAN RAILWAYMEN.

5. WE HAVE HEARD RUMOURS REPORTED IN WESTERN PRESS THAT ALL TRAIN SERVICE FROM USSR TO CHINA HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED INCLUDING SHIPMENTS TO VIETNAM BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE SO FAR TO CONFIRM THIS

FORD

FM TOKYO MAR14/69 CONFD

TO EXTEROTT 473 PRIORITY

INFO TT WSHDC LDN PARIS BRU BONN HAGUE ROME CNBRA DE OTT MOSCO
CANDELNATO DELHI DE LDN HKONG DE TOKYO WLGTN DE CNBRA WSAW BGRAD
DE PARIS

REF YOURTEL S266 MAR12

SINO-SOVIET

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WE SPOKE TODAY WITH MIYAZAWA, HEAD OF GAIMUSHOS USSR DIV AND INFORMED
HIM OF GENERAL LINES OF SOVIET DEMARCHE IN OTT. HE CONFIRMED THAT
SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON GAIMUSHO MAR 11 AND HAD DESCRIBED
INCIDENT AND RUSSIAN VIEWS MUCH ALONG LINES OF OTT DISCUSSION. THERE
WERE HOWEVER TWO DIFFERENCES WHICH OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED MIYAZAWA.
FIRST THE AMBASSADORS CALL HERE HAD BEEN ON FM RATHER THAN PM AS
WAS DONE IN BONN AND OTT. SECOND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD CONFINED
HIMSELF TO FACTUAL STATEMENTS AND HAD NOT/NOT INCLUDED EXPRESSION
OF HOPE FOR JPNSE UNDERSTANDING OF ANY ACTIONS USSR MIGHT TAKE.
MIYAZAWA SPECULATED THIS SLIGHTLY MORE RESERVED APPROACH IN TOKYO
MIGHT BE DUE TO SOVIET EXPECTATION THAT DUE TO JPN'S RACIAL AFFINITY
WITH CHINA ITS REACTION TO SOVIET CASE MIGHT BE LESS SYMPATHETIC
THAN THAT WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED FROM WESTERN COUNTRIES. MIYAZAWA
ALSO NOTED USSR MIGHT HAVE HAD IN MIND ITS OUTSTANDING TERRI-
TORYL DISPUTE WITH JPN REGARDING NORTHERN ISLANDS.

2. MIYAZAWA SAID SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD STRESSED THERE WAS NO/NO
LIKELIHOOD OF ANY EARLY IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE HAD

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PAGE TWO 473 CONF D

ALSO COMMENTED ON RELATIVELY HIGH DEATH TOLL ON SOVIET SIDE. AMBASSADOR SAID SOVIET BORDER GUARDS IN THAT AREA HAD BEEN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT/NOT TO RESIST CHINESE BORDER INCURSIONS WITH FIREARMS. THEY WERE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE BY CHINESE FIRE AND WERE NOT/NOT IN A POSITION TO RESPOND PROMPTLY.

3. MIYAZAWA SAID GAIMUSHO ASSESSMENT WAS THAT BORDER INCIDENT HAD BEEN PLANNED IN ADVANCE BY CHINESE SIDE AT FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL. HOWEVER THEY THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT PEKING WOULD ATTEMPT A SIMILAR PROVOCATION IN NEAR FUTURE. SIMILARLY THE SOVIET UNION WAS UNLIKELY TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE ALTHOUGH IT WOULD PROBABLY REACT STRONGLY TO ANY FURTHER CHINESE ATTEMPT. HE SAID THAT WITH USSR'S OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN EUROPE IT WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST.

4. GAIMUSHO DOES THEREFORE NOT/NOT INTERPRET USSR DEMARCHE IN VARIOUS WORLD CAPITALS AS A PRELUDE TO DRASTIC SOVIET ACTION AGAINST CHINA. RATHER THEY INTERPRETED THIS AS SOVIET EFFORT TO MAKE QUITE CLEAR TO OTHER COUNTRIES THAT USSR WAS THE INNOCENT PARTY IN THE MAR2 BORDER INCIDENT AND TO PREPARE A SYMPATHETIC INNATL RESPONSE IN THE EVENT THEY SHOULD BE FORCED TO REACT TO ANY FURTHER CHINESE PROVOCATION.



(C 3/14)

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRET

17 MAR 1969

J. I. C.

12 March, 1969

17 MAR 1969

FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No. 310/1

Dear Brian,

Sino-Soviet Border Incident

At today's CIA briefing of the Commonwealth Liaison Officers, of the Soviet desk and of the China desk of OCI spoke on this subject.

2. While admitting that, apart from the statements put out by Peking and Moscow, they had little firm evidence to go on, both said that they believed on the basis of all they had seen that the Chinese and not the Russians had taken the initiative on this occasion. was inclined to think that Peking's motive was similar to that which caused them to move against India in 1962 i.e. the Chinese had decided, possibly reacting to previous border incidents for which the Russians had been responsible, to teach the latter a lesson by giving them a bloody nose. To this extent it would be fair to say that the Chinese had planned to attack the Russians when they exposed themselves by crossing the "frontier" on a suitable occasion.

3. Commenting on the reasons for the immediate publicity the Russians had given to the incident, said he thought they had reacted so quickly because they recognised at once that it was a serious event which would almost certainly become public and they therefore wanted to get their version out to the world before the Chinese. He thought that the main reason the Russians were making so much of this incident was because it was the worst for a long time and, fearing that the Chinese might follow it up others, a vigorous reaction now might cause the Chinese to think twice before doing so. Another but subsidiary reason for the violent Soviet reaction was, thought, the Russians belief that they could use it to advantage in unifying the world communist movement behind them in preparing for the conference in May. Yet another, but thought much less certain possibility, was the intention by some element or all of the Soviet leadership to exploit this incident in support of a new vigilance campaign. He noted that Sovetskaya Rossiya had quoted this incident as part of a more general encirclement of the Soviet Union which necessitated increased vigilance on the part of the Soviet people. He added, however, that the other principal Moscow newspapers had not so far taken up this call but had concentrated on appealing to the patriotic sentiments of the Soviet people against the Chinese aggressor.

B. T. W. Stewart, Esq., C.B.E.,
Cabinet Office.

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4. also mentioned what he described as a curious diplomatic development in this affair which rather mystified them. This was that the Russians had arranged for their diplomatic representatives in Bonn, Vienna, Tokyo and Paris to call on the local governments to explain the Soviet position. The Russians may have taken similar action in other capitals: they had not done so as yet in Washington. This action, said, reflected Moscow's concern to ensure that their version of the incident gained adequate publicity and recognition.

5. said that their Military Attaché in Moscow had reported that an American student at Moscow University had informed him that Soviet students were being recalled for military service and that some of them had related this development to the border incident. Their Military Attaché had obtained no other evidence to support this story. emphasised that the source was rather dubious and they were treating the M.A.'s report with all reserve for the time being.

6. Commenting on the timing of this incident from the Chinese point of view, said that they thought one factor must be the impending Chinese Party Congress. The incident was certainly providing the Chinese with most useful propaganda for re-establishing internal unity behind Mao. also said that there had been some speculation in the Agency that this incident reflected struggle within the top leadership: those pursuing a hard line could well have been behind this incident to strengthen Mao's position. did not himself seem to accept this interpretation.

7. Looking to the future, neither nor believed that either Moscow or Peking was likely to extend the conflict. said that Peking must realise that, if they went much further, they were likely to call down upon themselves a very violent response from the Russians. reading of the publicity from Moscow was that the Russians, having warned the Chinese to desist, were not working to exacerbate the situation any further.

8. I enclose two spare copies of this letter for John Thomson and Justin Staples.

Passed
AS
17B

Yours ever,

ddh
(E. BOLLAND).

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c.c.c.: C. N. Joslin, Esq.,
MOD/DIS.

J.K.E. Broadley, Esq.,
PUSD

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JIC(A)(69)(N)35(DRAFT) *[not issued as final]*

11th March 1969

COPY NO. 68

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (A)

Reaskey

JIC(A) NOTE



The following draft JIC(A) Note by the Far East Current Intelligence Group is circulated for the consideration of the Joint Intelligence Committee (A) at their meeting on THURSDAY, 13th MARCH 1969.

SINO-SOVIET BORDER INCIDENT

1. Since JIC(A)(69)(N)31 was issued we have received no evidence to indicate increased military activity on either side of the border, following the incident of 2nd March.
2. The Chinese made maximum use of the incident for propaganda purposes. They mounted four days of demonstrations outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking, as well as in other Chinese cities, and in their public comment linked the incident with the invasion of Czechoslovakia to portray the Soviet Union as the aggressive heir of Imperial Russia. The Soviet Government's public reaction was at first comparatively restrained. After making their initial protest public with unusual speed (presumably with the intention of forestalling the inevitable Chinese propaganda) they gave no undue prominence to reports or comment on it for several days. On 7th March, however - apparently in response to the violent and continuing Chinese reaction - large scale demonstrations began outside the Chinese Embassy in Moscow; these lasted for two days, and although the demonstrators were on the whole orderly and the Embassy heavily guarded, a number of Embassy windows were broken. On the same day the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement describing the incident, in which they announced their own casualties as having been thirty-one killed and fourteen wounded, and alleged that the Chinese

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had shot or bayoneted some wounded men and mutilated their bodies. They set their claim that the Chinese had caused the incident in the context of the forthcoming Chinese Communist Party Congress, and of the "serious economic and political failures" in China from which they alleged that the attention of the Chinese people was being diverted.

3. We still consider it most likely that the incident had a local or accidental origin, and do not believe that either side intends to extend the conflict. The references in Chinese propaganda to their own "forbearance" and the fact that they have refrained from demanding any Soviet withdrawal from "Chinese" territory are worth noting in this context. Nevertheless the exchange of public vituperation which has followed the incident will have further heightened Sino-Soviet tension.

(Signed) N.R.L. BRISTOW

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committees

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

11th March 1969

DISTRIBUTION

JIC(A)
Mr. F.T. Copeland

Mr. C.F.W. Hooper, Canada House

And telegraphed to -

CIA(Washington) and Authorities, BE Washington, JIC Ottawa and Authorities, BHC Ottawa, Surv. Sec. SHAPE, ACOS(I) SACLANT and ACOS(I) SHAPE.

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British Embassy,
WASHINGTON D.C.

5 March, 1969

COL/6
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CABINET OFFICE	
10 MAR 1969	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE No. 310/11	

Dear Brian,

SINO/SOVIET BORDER INCIDENT

At today's C.I.A. briefing of the Commonwealth Liaison Officers, who was in the Chair, referred to this subject.

2. said that on the actual incident they had no other information than was provided in the announcements made by the two sides.

3. He said that it looked to the Agency as if this was one of a series of frontier clashes which had, however, been rather larger than those which had occurred previously. Both sides had political reasons for publicising this particular incident. The Russians might well have regarded it as providing them with useful publicity in preparation for the forthcoming meeting of the World Communist Movement in Moscow. A meeting of the Preparatory Committee was to be held there on 17 March. The Chinese would also find it useful in preparing for the forthcoming Ninth Party Congress. thought it was nonsense to associate this incident or the attendant publicity, as some newspapers had done, with the Berlin crisis.

IC REGISTRY

Quartermaster:

Mr TITMUS

Mr SCARLES

Mr

10 MAR 69 B.T.W. Stewart, Esq., C.M.G.,
Cabinet Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

Joslin

Eddie
(E. BOLLAND)

c.c. C. N. Joslin, Esq.,
MOD/DIS

J.K.K. Broadley, Esq.,
P.U.S.D.

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J X
7 OCT 1968

Mr Hayman

General de Gaulle and the Spectre of a
German/Chinese alliance

(Paris secret telegram No 961 of 26 September)

I attach a note about actual German-Chinese contacts and Soviet and Chinese comment on them.

2. The Russians in their more serious propaganda have noted on several occasions a very real growth in German-Chinese trade. In cruder polemics they have pointed out numerous similarities in the political situations of the two countries, suggested that these are likely to be formalised in closer relations, and have accused the Chinese of collusion with German and American monopolists (in retaliation to Chinese allegations of Soviet attempts at 'encirclement'). All this is on the level of the Russian accusations of Chinese toleration of colonialism in Hongkong.


3. Some influential Germans evidently see in China potential support for their political and economic aspirations. The German Government is inhibited from establishing diplomatic relations for reasons which probably include respect for US views, but they have contacts through Embassies in neutral countries. In (June ?) 1964 the Federal Government permitted NCNA to establish a representative in Bonn and the German Press Agency was allowed a correspondent (Herr Bargman) in Peking. These could provide an unofficial link.

4. The Chinese blow hot and cold on Germany as it suits them, depending on their current attitude to the DDR and hopes of securing the latter's sympathy in the Sino-Soviet dispute. They must value W. German trade, although they would like Germany to import more to improve the balance. They appear to hold out a bait of a formal trade agreement, but evidently intend that the Germans should accord them diplomatic recognition first. According to secret sources, West German industrialists believe there is little prospect of formal trade relations before diplomatic recognition.

5. German-Chinese relations shew a tendency to expand (this is not the same as improving). But the motives of the two sides are disparate and it can hardly be said that common antagonism towards the Soviet Union is a uniting factor at present. Some China experts with whom I have spoken consider it inconceivable that a communist Chinese Government would ever contemplate an actual 'alliance' with a capitalist country. But the two/

Dr Staples
Mr Goldsworthy
4/10/68
4/10/68

two countries might eventually see increasing advantage in implying something of the sort in order to play on Soviet nerves. The Russians are likely to see through this and treat it as a subject for propaganda rather than a serious consideration for their policies. But some residue of anxiety might remain. President de Gaulle's evaluation of such a possible trend in the next five years is undoubtedly unrealistic and exaggerated. Nevertheless if he chooses to make it public, it could prove just as disconcerting to the Russians as his themes of 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' and 'L'Europe des Patries'.


(E.E. Orchard)
30 September, 1968

cc Mr Giffard (N Dept)
Mr Denson (FE Dept)
Mr Winchester (W Dept)
~~Mr J Thoms on~~ (Cabinet Office)
Miss Giachardi (JRD)
Mr Brewer (JRD)
Director of Research
Miss Draycott (IRD)

Note on German/Chinese contacts and the Sino/Soviet Dispute

A. Substance

1. Trade. Indirect and private contacts with German firms began in 1954 or earlier. After considerable fluctuations trade has been tending to increase, with Chinese exports running at £26million and imports at £28m in 1965, rising sharply to £33m : £46m in 1966 (latest firm figures).
2. In May 1964 a German official representative told the Western Governments that the Federal Government was contemplating a formal trade agreement following approaches from China through an Embassy in a neutral country. There was no follow-up. In December 1964 the Federal Chancellor said that his Government was ready within certain limits to increase and formalise trade with China. In September 1965 Chen Yi, answering a German question at a press conference, said that the time was not ripe for official trade agreements, and that Germany was colluding with the militarists, etc. In 1966 the Federal Govt. agreed to guarantee credits of 350m DM to cover the German share in a projected consortium for a steel plant. In April 1967, Herr Bargman of DPA said in a conversation reported confidentially (to which our Embassy did not attach great credibility) that the Chinese were pressing through Paris and Berne for the establishment of a W German trade mission, and that he was convinced that they aimed at diplomatic relations. This report was taken up by Izvestia on 12 April, and denounced as lies by People's Daily on 6 May (possibly for tactical reasons, since it was rumoured that Bargman had an interview with Chen Yi the previous day).

B Polemics

3. On 12 April 1967, under the headline 'Bows to the Imperialists', Izvestia drew attention to a reorientation of Chinese trade towards the West, and emphasised with German 'monopolists' with whom trade had risen to third place, after Japan and Hongkong (as a result of the steel project). The article referred to the possibility of an exchange of diplomatic missions and quoted the Daily Express to the effect that the Chinese were ready to recognise W Berlin as part of the FGR. On 6 May, People's Daily called the reports a 'pack of lies', and went on to criticise Soviet relations with W Germany, including allegations of Soviet acquiescence in W German participation in NATO nuclear planning. On 7 July the Soviet New Times returned to the attack, listing Chinese sales of steel, barges, etc to the US for use in Vietnam, and Germany as another 'sordid' trading partner. On 13 March the Soviet Radio Peace and Progress, broadcasting in Chinese, said that the volume of German/Chinese trade had increased from 866m DM in 1966 to 1100m DM in 1967, and commented that the Chinese press never criticised W Germany and its revanchism, noting an alleged statement by Mao that the Oder-Neisse line was illegal. Der Spiegel was quoted as saying that the NPD pinned its hopes on the Chinese and wished to establish diplomatic relations. The close relations between Peking and Bonn were founded on the sole basis of Mao's antagonism against the USSR. On 29 March 1968, an article in Izvestia, entitled 'They have found each other' and quoted by TASS in foreign news services, drew attention to sympathetic reports in W German broadcasts on the Cultural Revolution and drew attention to a common German and Chinese interest/

interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and in the revision of frontiers (referring to an alleged statement by Mao in an interview with Japanese socialists on 10 June, 1964, to the 'injustice' of European frontiers). It also noted Chinese references to 'the two parts of Germany' and to the DDR as 'Eastern Germany' (in the context of the Karlovyvary meeting, which the Chinese denounced). Herr Brand was quoted as saying 'China is distant, but nevertheless Germany may have a China card in her hand which should not be put aside or ignored'. Herr Bartsel was quoted as saying 'Mao's ideas might be of interest from the point of view of the policy of the CDU/CSU'. Izvestia pointed out that publication of a weekly journal of Mao's views, called China, had just been permitted in Hamburg, and also that Bonn was encouraging activities by pro-Peking political groups.

4. The Soviet political commentator, Ernst Henry, returned to these themes at considerable length in the Soviet Literary Gazette on 10 April, 1968, treating a Bonn-Peking alliance as an insurance against German isolation and the collapse of NATO. He emphasised the similarities in the political situations of the two countries. On 9 June Sovetskaya Rossia hit the nail on the head with a headline: 'Will a Bonn-Peking Axis be Created?', taken from a report in the Bulgarian press. This referred to influential pressures within the German Government (supported by Herr Strauss) for diplomatic relations, and listed a few more affinities, including a common interest in preventing relaxation of tension, anti-Sovietism, and favourable propaganda about each other.

Soviet Section, JRD
30 September, 1968.

Note: the above reports are undoubtedly incomplete. They draw on information provided by China Sections in JRD and IRD, but not directly on West German reports.

1600/147/67G



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

28th December, 1967.

(A)

Dear Brooks,

Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950

I know from my past experience that the question of the validity of this Treaty is of considerable importance. I am therefore sending you the enclosed copy of a note from the C.I.A. about a reference made in an article in "International Affairs" to this question just in case it may not have been noticed by our people in London.

2. I enclose a spare copy of this letter with enclosure for Northern Department of the Foreign Office.

Secretary

Mr. (Harman SIS) copy to M.W.M.D. ^(given) ~~Butler, de la~~
subj. SIS A Team to see & (E. BOLLAND).
SIS Registry ^{to see} ~~to see~~ ^{pass to N. Dept.}
Mu31

Yours ever,

To M.W.M.D. ^(given) ~~Butler, de la~~

to see & (E. BOLLAND).
pass to N. Dept.

Br

F. B. Richards, Esq., CMG, DSC,
Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1.

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
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